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 Since the USS Cole incident in October 2000, and particularly since the terrorist 
attacks of September 2001, Force Protection has become a fundamental issue.  Of 
particular concern to the Navy is waterfront Force Protection: the protection of in-port 
High Value Units from attacks from the sea.  The unpredictability of when or how a 
terrorist attack might be executed makes simulation an excellent tool for analyzing the 
waterfront force protection issue quantitatively.  This thesis develops and implements a 
simulation model of Patrol Boats at the Naval Submarine Base in Bangor, Washington 
using Java and Simkit, both of which are platform independent, and therefore universally 
usable.  The simulation is run pitting eight different notional Patrol Boat configurations 
(varying the number of patrol boats used, their intercepting and patrolling speeds, and 
their patrolling patterns) against eight notional terrorist attacks.  The results of the 
simulation runs are analyzed, and general conclusions are drawn.  The results indicate 
that the number of patrol boats used in an area and the speed they use to intercept threats 
are the most important factors of the four analyzed.  Patrolling speed and patrolling 
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The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 have made it  clear that  Force 
Protection must be a primary concern for our military force commanders.  The threat of 
attacks on US soil is now a reality.  Just as real is the threat of attacks on US waterways, 
and specifically upon in port high value US Naval units.  Ships that are very potent 
weapons upon the high seas are very vulnerable targets when tied to piers.  Analysis of 
the use of waterborne force protection assets--specifically patrol boats--can provide 
valuable insights into how high value Naval units can be effectively protected from 
attacks from the sea. 
This thesis undertakes such an analysis using simulation.  The specific setting of 
its analysis is Naval Submarine Base, Bangor, Washington, but the simulation can be 
applied to any waterfront area to allow for analysis of patrol craft operations.  Simulation 
is an analysis tool especially suited to the terrorist attack problem, since terrorist attacks 
follow no particular (deterministic) patterns.  Simulation, in this setting, allows for data 
collection in the absence of real data, by generating scenarios of interest, and seeing how 
patrol boats fare.  Insofar as parameters--such as patrol boat speed, traffic intensity, and 
terrorist attack tactics--used within a simulation model are accurate reflections of reality, 
the results of the model provide real insights into force protection effectiveness. 
The simulation within this thesis uses state-of-the-art techniques and software to 
model the waterfront at Sub Base Bangor.   The basic waterfront is modeled, and is 
populated with patrol boats and randomly arriving and maneuvering vessels (i.e. traffic).  
Patrol boats remain in their patrolling patterns at low patrolling speeds, unless a contact 
moves inside the waterfront’s exclusion zone, at which time a patrol boat accelerates to 
intercept it.  After a time delay, a terrorist attack is attempted by either one or two attack 
craft--which, of course, are not known to be attack craft.  Within the model, patrol boats 
are deployed in eight different configurations (varying their numbers, patterns and 
speeds) to protect the base’s “delta” pier at which Trident submarines are moored.  Each 
of  the different patrol boat configurations is run a number of times against eight different 
kinds of notional terrorist attacks, differing in the number of attackers and their 
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approaches.  In this way, the patrolling tactics can be compared across the same range of 
challenges so more successful configurations can be identified. 
Analysis of the simulation output provided useful insights.  Specifically, the 
model runs indicated that the keys to successful defense of the pier against a range of 
terrorist attacks are increasing the number of patrol boats deployed--to the maximum of 
four analyzed within the model--and increasing the speed at which the patrol boats 
intercept targets identified as threats.  It may seem a computer simulation is not necessary 
to produce that insight.  However, analysis of the simulation also indicated that neither 
patrolling speed (analyzed at two and five knots) nor the patrolling pattern (analyzed as a 
barrier and a bow tie or race track) of the boats had a significant effect upon outcomes.  
This implies that simple patterns and low patrolling speeds can be used.  Both results 
have practical import for operators and equipment.  A simple pattern allows for more 
concentration upon contact monitoring, and slower speeds may well result in greater fuel 
efficiency and fewer maintenance needs. 
Analysis of the notional data was accomplished both through linear regression 
and, somewhat more intuitively, through graphical displays using a spreadsheet. 
Enhancements to the simulation could allow decision makers to run the model directly, 
defining simulation parameters.  The exploratory analysis of the thesis can be used as a 
guide for analyses of patrol boat configurations using real data.  Hence, in addition to the 
insights gained through the aforementioned analysis, the thesis provides both a tool and a 






A. AREA OF RESEARCH 
In recent times, attention has been being drawn to the threat of asymmetric and 
specifically terrorist attacks upon US military targets.  Both JV 2020 and the 1997 Report 
of the National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st 
Century, cite asymmetric threats as a primary concern for strategy and force planning 
considerations in the twenty-first century. JV 2020 posits that in the face of US 
conventional force dominance “the appeal of asymmetric approaches and the focus on the 
development of niche capabilities will increase”[Ref. 1; p. 4]. The National Defense 
Panel, in like manner, notes that would-be aggressors “may find new ways to attack our 
interests, our forces, and our citizens”[Ref. 2; p. 11].  Other literature concerned with the 
emerging nature of warfare—what we can now call “postmodern” warfare—is even more 
blunt and stark about what we must be able to defend and/or fight against in our times. 
Martin van Crevald, in discussing postmodern warfare writes: “War will not take place in 
the open field . . . Its normal mise en scene will be complex environments, either those 
provided by nature or else the even more complex ones created by men.  It will be a war of 
listening devices and of car-bombs. . .”[Ref. 3; p. 626].   Carter et al., in their article 
Catastrophic Terrorism, raise the specter of large-scale terrorist attacks and call for 
counter-terrorist systems and postures that “highlight defensive needs before an incident 
happens”[Ref. 4; p. 83].  The terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, and 
Pennsylvania in September 2001 have certainly made the fact of the terrorist threat real, 
and their targeting of civilian centers adds universality to the struggle against terrorism, 
which is no longer to be confined to military arenas.  They also made clear that we have 
not adopted the proper pro-active deterrent or defensive posture, at least at the national 
level.  The war that those 11 September attacks began can only be waged effectively if 
proper force protection measures are established that can provide good defense in safe 
havens (e.g. ports) while offensive strikes are carried out elsewhere.  Those measures 
need to be developed not by best guesses, but by specifically tailored quantitative 
analyses that can provide the best possible fo rce protection measures for a given location 
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under specified operating conditions, assumed threat dispositions, and defined rules of 
engagement. 
 
B. CONTEMPORARY NAVAL FORCE PROTECTION ISSUES 
The 11 September attacks notwithstanding, we have known for quite some time, 
and very specifically since the USS Cole incident of October 2000, that high value and 
highly visible Naval targets are vulnerable to terrorism (particularly when in port), and 
that more robust force protection measures must be put in place.  In his discussion of the 
Cole incident and recommendations made in its aftermath, retired Admiral Harold W. 
Gehman Jr. confirmed that van Crevald’s description of the postmodern, asymmetric and 
terrorist age of warfare is accurate and will remain so: “The Cole was attacked by a truck 
bomb.  It had an outboard motor, but it was a truck bomb . . . So what is the next attack 
going to look like?  It is going to be a truck bomb in daylight, and it is going to be applied 
in some new and different way . . . Essentially, the bottom line of our force protection 
recommendations was to raise the cost of doing business in high threat areas”[Ref. 5].  
Adm. Gehman’s conclusion was disastrously borne out by the “truck bombs” that flew 
into the Trade Center towers and the Pentagon, so it stands to reason that our force 
protection efforts must be re-doubled to defend against that very sort of physical attack.  
David Weeks further focuses our attention upon the waterfront: “Since the devastation at 
Khobar Towers in 1996, the U.S. armed forces had dramatically increased their force 
protection and antiterrorism posture.  Unfortunately for the Navy, the effort centered on 
the area from the main gate to ship quarterdecks, with very little attention paid to security 
from the waterside of the fleet—the gap, or ‘seam,’ referred to by former Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen in his introduction to the Cole Commission Report”[Ref 6].   
Even prior to 11 September, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) had directed 
Commanders to re-enforce that seam.   His guidance clearly shows that force protection 
of vital naval assets is a primary and pervasive concern: “Force Protection considerations 
must become a primary planning factor for every mission, activity, or event—in-CONUS 
or out-of-CONUS.  All commanders and commanding officers must fully integrate this 
key enabling factor into every operation.” [Ref. 7].  Force Commanders have, in fact, 
begun to address the gap.  In particular, Commander Submarine Forces Atlantic 
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(ComSubLant) and Commander Submarine Forces Pacific (ComSubPac) have focused 
their attention—particularly after the Cole incident—upon Trident Class or, more 
generally, Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine (SSBN) in-port Force Protection 
measures.  To this end the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory was contracted by 
the Chief of Naval Operations Submarine Division, Science and Technology Branch 
(N775), to develop the In-Port/Near-Port Project, which was launched to improve force 
protection of US ballistic missile submarines: 
The In-Port/Near-Port Project is a new project focusing exclusively on in-
port and near-port asymmetric vulnerabilities of the SSBN force.  Four 
tasks—[1]vulnerability characterization, [2]vulnerability assessment, 
[3]countermeasures assessment and concept development, and [4]risk 
assessment, comprise this project...The Countermeasure Assessment and 
Concept Development Task will assess existing countermeasures and 
develop new operational countermeasure concepts.  Recommendations 
may range from changes in operating procedures to new systems 
concepts...[Ref. 8]. 
The message traffic from Sub Base Bangor after the 11 September attacks makes 
it clear force protection analyses already underway have a new sense of relevance and 
urgency:   
On September 11th the world changed.  The terrorist attacks against the 
citizens of our country painfully revealed the vulnerabilities of freedom.  
As Commanding Officers, you need to be thinking about the 
vulnerabilities of your ship and crew.  2.  The day to day readiness of the 
Trident Submarine Force to conduct its assigned mission is a critical 
element of our nation’s security.  Survivability has always been our top 
priority, but now, we must evaluate our practices for relevance.  You 
trained you crew for the ASW [Anti-Submarine Warfare] threat, you now 
have the challenge to prepare them to deal with terrorism.  Make no 
mistake about it, the terrorist threat is real. [Ref. 9] 
 
C. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Clearly, the overarching fleet force protection objective is effective protection of 
vital pier-side assets.  The objective of this thesis is to contribute to that overall effort by 
quantifying the basic elements of waterfront force protection assets, possible waterborne 
attackers, and their interaction through a model/simulation.  This effort is meant to 
augment and complement the Johns Hopkins effort.  The Johns Hopkins database is a 
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useful descriptor of base layout and extant force protection assets and procedures, but it 
provides no calculation, recommendations or analyses to increase force protection 
effectiveness.  It does nothing substantial to address the third (countermeasures 
assessment and concept development) and fourth (risk assessment) tasks of the In-
Port/Near-Port Project.  This thesis investigates steps that can be taken to strengthen 
waterfront force protection at Sub Base Bangor, WA, the homeport of Trident 
Submarines (SSBN’s) under Commander Submarine Group Nine (CSG-9).  To help 
CSG-9—and by extension any waterfront commands and even, more broadly, any 
specific location—more effectively and proactively protect assets, a method of analyzing 
different force protection configurations’ effectiveness against a distribution of possible 
attacks must be developed.  
By focusing upon specific geographies and feasible force distributions at specific 
waterfront locations, a limited number of possible scenarios can be subjected to 
quantitatively meaningful analysis.  Even so, the terrorist attack problem presents a 
difficulty to the analyst.  Because of the random and isolated nature of terrorist attacks, 
there simply are no data sets describing the effects of terrorist attacks, per se, on a given 
kind of target.  All one can say is how harmful a given, unrepeated—and often 
unrepeatable—attack was; one cannot generate statistics.  The terrorism problem, in other 
words, cannot be analyzed using traditional means.  The best hope one has in 
meaningfully dealing with the very real threat of waterfront terrorist attacks 
quantitatively is through simulation[Ref. 10; p. 91].  This thesis will develop such a 
simulation to allow investigative analysis of force protection asset configuration and 
thereby address the tasking of  N775 to “assess existing countermeasures and develop 
new operational countermeasure concepts.” 
 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS AND METHODOLOGY 
The simulation will give insight into the potential success of defensive patrol boat 
units in response to different terrorist threats.  It will, therefore, serve as an exploratory 
tool in the development of patrol and tactical approaches under geographical and 
equipment constraints and existing rules of engagement.  The simulation will make it 
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possible to compare different tactical approaches under the given MOE of preventing any 
successful intercept of an SSBN by a Threat, and to determine if different tactics lead to 
statistically different outcomes.  The simulation will not and cannot predict either the 
onset or outcome of an attack; but it can be used effectively to gain insight into robust 
force protection postures and resource needs by focusing on the waterborne element, and 
to demonstrate what kinds of analyses can be accomplished with its output. 
The physical basis of the model is the waterfront geography at Naval Submarine 
Base Bangor, Washington, centered on the “Delta” pier at which SSBN’s are moored. 
  
Figure 1.   Force Protection Posture Sub Base Bangor Waterfront.  After [Ref. 11] 
 
The geography is modeled as a rectangle defined in its length (North-South axis) 
by sensor capacity and in its width (East-West axis) by the width of the river.  CSG-9 
initially had up to two contracted patrol boats on guard duty in the vicinity of Delta Pier. 
In the aftermath of 11 September, more assets have been committed. Exploratory analysis 
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performance is closely tied to detection equipment, the location and performance of 
which can be varied with model expansion to a non- line of sight problem. 
The model will be implemented in Java[Ref. 12] and Simkit[Ref. 13]. These are 
both freely available tools and can be executed on any operating system, thanks to Java’s 
platform independence.   Simkit is the result of earlier work done at the Naval 
Postgraduate School by K. Stork in his thesis, Sensors in Object Oriented Programming 
with Java: An Introduction. [Ref. 14] 
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II. SERVER AND MOVER EVENT BASED SIMULATION 
A. OBJECTS, DISCRETE EVENT SIMULATION AND EVENT GRAPHS 
The Force Protection simulation described herein is written in Java, an object-
oriented language. Object-oriented programming languages stand in contrast to 
imperative programming languages or structured programming languages, like 
FORTRAN  or BASIC. [Ref. 15; p. 15]    The essential characteristic of object-oriented 
programming, and that which makes it a natural fit for simulation, is that it "considers a 
problem to consist of collections of objects and the various interactions between them.  
These objects often model artifacts that are present in the real world [Ref. 15; p. 35].  The 
objects within a program can assume a state and transition from one state to another 
based upon what happens in the simulation.  Object-oriented programming is therefore 
ideal for simulation implementation because it has an intuitive correspondence with the 
reality being modeled.  It is much more sensible, for example, to develop a simulation of 
Patrol Boats against Threats using objects called Patrol Boats and Threats, which behave 
in certain programmed ways, than to deal with mere variables or mathematical 
expressions.  Beyond that, object-oriented programming allows for the re-use of given 
objects, or software components, because objects are self-contained entities that can 
either be used in different simulations as they stand, or be adapted or "extended," in 
Simkit terms, to fit a role only slightly different from a previous function.  Because 
object-oriented programming models problems in terms of objects transitioning from one 
state to another, it lends itself to Discrete Event Simulation, which is really nothing more 
than what it says (simulation realized through the tracking of successive events) and is 
specifically the time –varying state of a simulation's component objects. 
The following general discussion is based upon Law and Kelton [Ref. 10] and 
Buss [Ref. 16].  Discrete Event Simulation (DES), or modeling, is built upon two 
fundamental elements, “a set of state variables, and a set of events” [Ref. 16].  The state 
variables as a collective do what their name suggests: they define the state of the system 
being modeled at any given time.  The choice of state variables in any DES is very 
important because those variables alone will be what represent the reality being 
modeled—the variables chosen, in other words, must be sufficient to capture the 
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important features or components of the simulated reality.  The events in a DES are the 
changes the state variables undergo at specific (instantaneous) moments in time.  Most 
events change the state of the system, while others do not—the event that stops a 
simulation, for example, has no effect on the state variables.  A DES simulates the reality 
or system being modeled by generating “state trajectories,” or plots of state variable 
values over time.  These state trajectories provide statistics for state variables that allow 
analysis of system—and, by extension, system component—performance.  The way a 
system performs relies entirely upon when and how frequently various events occur.  In 
fact, unless one wishes to simulate total inactivity, it is precisely the timing of successive 
events undertaken by key elements (read state variables) that defines the entire 
simulation.  Hence, for the two components of DES actually to be a simulation, they must 
have some sort of engine, some scheduler by which a simulation moves from potens  to 
actus.  This engine is the Future Event List. 
Buss puts the matter succinctly: “the Future Event List (or simply the Event List) . 
. . is nothing more than a ‘to-do’ list of scheduled events”[Ref. 16].  As with all to-do 
lists, it is constantly being changed or updated based upon current events—like the 
meeting that becomes necessary between your next two appointments as a result of the 
phone call you just received.  The future event list is perhaps the singular feature—from 
whence it derives its name—of DES that distinguishes it from time-stepped simulation, in 
that it advances simulation time at varying intervals determined by scheduled events 
rather than advancing time in constant sized steps regardless of whether anything is 
happening in the simulation at the next regular time step or not.  In DES, progress is 
driven by events, not time.  The timing of events is certainly vitally important, since it 
affects the relative state trajectories of the systems’ components, and therefore the state of 
the system at large; but that very timing is a function of events that need to be 
accomplished.  Because of the event list, a Discrete Event’s Simulation’s progress is 
actually very conceptually simple; it just moves from one event to the next event on the 
Event List until there are no events left—or until it is told to execute an event that tells it 
to stop.  In other words, at any single moment, a DES is only concerned, so to speak, with 
the event being executed and the next scheduled event: its field of vision is one event 
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long—this is the very reason Event Graphs are so useful in describing DES, as discussed 
below.  Law and Kelton summarize the Event List driven progress of a DES quite nicely: 
The simulation clock in initialized to zero and the times of occurrence of 
future events are determined.  The simulation clock is then advanced to 
the time of occurrence of the most imminent (first) of these future events, 
at which point the state of the system is updated to account for the fact that 
an event has occurred, and our knowledge of the times of occurrence of 
future events is also updated [note that the event is instantaneous].  Then 
the simulation clock is advanced to the time of the (new) most imminent 
event [which may have been scheduled upon execution of the last event 
and inserted before all others in the list], the state of the system is updated, 
and future event times are determined, etc. [Ref. 10] 
This DES process is more efficiently captured by the discrete event algorithm, by 
which the future event list is managed.  In pseudo-code the algorithm looks something 
like this: 
While (Event List is not empty) 
Advance time to next event 
State transition for event 
Remove event from list 
Schedule other event(s) (if necessary) 
 
Event graphs  are the most efficient means of showing how an event-based 
simulation is constructed. They allow for graphical abstraction of event-based models, “a 
way of representing the Future Event List logic for a discrete-event model"[Ref. 18].  The 
event graph was first developed by L. Schruben in 1983 [Ref. 17] and is discussed in 
detail by A. Buss.  Buss has specifically used the event graph construct in demonstrating 
some of the basic functionality of Simkit, which is the simulation program used in this 
thesis. 
As with DES, event graphs have two essential elements, in this case nodes and 
directed edges: “Each node corresponds to an event, or state transition, and each edge 
corresponds to the scheduling of other events.  Each edge can optionally have an 
associated Boolean condition and/or a time delay"[Ref. 17 and Ref. 18].  The construct 
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demonstrates the progression through the Event List as described above, by presenting 
the movement from one event to the next pictorially.  The inclusion of conditions and 
time delays allows for a virtually complete demonstration of a program's logic without 
the necessity of having recourse to the code that implements it.  The linking of a number 
of Event Graphs is an ideal way to show not only the flow within a given program or 
"class" of a simulation, but as well the linking and interaction of component classes of 
that program, which is vital in both the development and presentation of an object-
oriented environment, and will be discussed further below.  The most basic relationship 
of Events is demonstrated by “the fundamental event graph construct:” 
 
 
Figure 2.   Fundamental Event Graph Construct 
 
Nodes A and B represent events or methods.  The small t shows there is a time 
delay, and the wavy line on the edge shows there is a Boolean condition, (i), that must be 
met for event B to occur.  Hence, the construct as a whole says that the occurrence of 
Event A causes Event B to be scheduled for execution after a time delay of t, provided 
the logical condition (i) is met.   
Once the fundamental event graph is understood, other event graphs are, 
relatively easily, recognized as extensions of that principle construct.  Once again, the 
important point is that any event graph is simply an abstraction of the events of an Event 
Based Simulation, which in turn means it is simply an illustration of how and in what 
order Events are placed on the Future Events List.  Anything that a modeler wants to 
have happen in a given simulation can happen only if it is scheduled, and it will only be 
scheduled if the programmer has provided a method to schedule it.  Once again the power 
of the Event Graph is a clear help: the only way an event can occur is if there is a directed 
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path of scheduling edges from the Run event to it.  Two more specific Event Graphs will 
provide sufficient background for specific application to the PatrolBoat model.  Both are 
pictures of general processes or classes that are fundamental to the Force Protection 
simulation.  The first is the “Arrival Process,” which, as the name suggests, simply 
“does” arrivals: it is a class that counts the number of arrivals of a given type of object 
onto the stage of a simulation, and schedules follow-on arrivals. 
 
Figure 3.   Event Graph of the Arrival Process with Run 
 
In this case, the Arrival Process is shown with the “Run” method attached.  The 
Run method is a vital part of any Simkit simulation program, because it is the method 
that indirectly resets state variables—as in this case, where “N”, the number of arrivals, is 
set to zero—and schedules the simulation’s first event.  The Arrival Process Event Graph 
(with the Run method attached) is interpreted thusly: upon the execution of the Run 
method, the number of arrivals, N, is set to zero, and the first Arrival is scheduled for—
placed on the Future Events List to occur at—time zero plus tA.  Since there is no logical 
condition to be met, the “do” Arrival method is executed, which means that at time tA the 
value of the state variable N is incremented a single unit and the next Arrival is scheduled 
to occur at time zero, plus tA, plus tA.  The process is simply repeated until the program is 
halted as discussed above. 
The second basic embellishment of the Basic Event Graph Construct (which 
includes that of the Arrival Process) is the Event Graph of the Multiple Server Queue—
the driving conceptual construct of the PatrolBoat simulation. 
tA
Run Arrival





Figure 4.   Event Graph of the Multiple Server Queue 
 
Model specifics about the Multiple Serve Queue model are given below.  As for 
the Event Graph itself, the interpretation is as follows:  the Run method resets the state 
variables Q (number of waiting customers) and S (the number of available servers) to 
their initial levels and schedules an Arrival as with the Arrival Process Above.  The 
Arrival Process, in turn, does what it always does—it increments the number of Arrivals, 
or, in this case, the number of customers in line, and schedules the next Arrival.  Now, 
however, the Arrival Process is attached to another event: the beginning of a Service.  
There is no time delay on the edge connecting the Arrival method and the Start Service 
method, but there is a logical condition that says a Start Service event can only be 
scheduled if there is at least one Server Available (if S > 0).  If that condition is met—a 
condition tested by an “if” statement within the Arrival event—then a Start Service event 
is put on the Event List with a zero time delay.  Upon the event Start Service (which 
takes place instantaneously), the state variable for the number of customers in line (Q) is 
decremented, as is the number of available Servers (S)—since the customer being served 
is no longer in line, and the Server who was available to serve that customer is now 
serving him, and therefore no longer available—and an End Service event  is 
automatically scheduled for a time ts after the Service began.  Note there is no Boolean 
condition, so any Start Service will automatically schedule an End Service.  After the 
service time, ts, has elapsed the End Service event is executed, whereby the “S” changes 














schedule an immediate Start Service Event if there are any customers in line—Q  > 0, as 
indicated by the condition on the scheduling edge connecting those two Event nodes. 
 
B. COMPONENT BASED PROGRAMMING AND SIMKIT 
An application of the programming concepts discussed to this point is achieved in 
Simkit, the simulation software package developed by Buss at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS).  The following discussion is derived from the full treatment of the subject 
in Component-Based Simulation Modeling [Ref. 19].  Simkit "uses Event Graphs as [its] 
underlying methodology", which means it is a DES package.  Simkit is also "component 
based," which essentially means it extends the basic idea of object oriented programming.   
Programming in components is very much like programming with objects, but one level 
higher.  Where objects are the fundamental building blocks of an object-oriented 
program, components, which contain objects within them, are the building blocks of 
more complex inter-connected programs or simulations.  Within any single program or 
class or component, action is executed directly within the body of the program.  For 
components to interact with other components there must be some means of connectivity, 
even though the component programs themselves are encapsulated.  Simply stated, 
certain components within a simulation (for example a Patrol Boat Controller, someone 
who coordinates the movements of Patrol Boats) need to be able to "see" or "hear" the 
actions of certain other components (for example, the Patrol Boats a Patrol Boat 
Controller controls) in order to execute their functions within a simulation at the proper 
time or sequence.  Writing long, complex chunks of code to connect components 
explicitly is not only tedious, but undermines a central premise of the object-oriented 
design, which is that of encapsulation.   What is necessary is the "coupling" of different 
components, a means of allowing components to interact or respond to each other as 
required without linking components too dir ectly—this "loose coupling" is a concept 
being developed at NPS and is the distinction between, as Buss puts it "simply designing 
with components and Component-Based design." 
Loose coupling is achieved within Simkit in two ways, one of which is inherent to 
Java, and the other of which is specific to Simkit.  Java includes a ProperyChangeEvent  
and PropertyChangeListener interface that signals or "fires" a change in state for a 
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variable upon the execution of a certain action within a program—for example, the  
addition of a customer to a queue in a service model fires a change in the size of the 
queue.  The change event is "heard" by any object or class that has been registered as a 
change listener to that event.  Simkit uses this feature of Java to keep track of the state 
trajectories throughout a simulation run so that statistics can be gathered and analysis 
performed.  To that end, the objects generally registered as listeners to 
PropertyChangeEvents are statistics-gathering objects or programs called "SimpleStats" 
objects in Simkit. 
The second kind of coupling or listening pattern that is unique to Simkit is called 
the SimEventListener pattern, which is especially useful when it is necessary to know 
when an event has occurred.  In fact, it is the SimEventListener pattern that allows a 
Simkit component based program to function at all, since it is that pattern that causes 
follow-on events to be scheduled upon completion of current events, thereby populating 
the Event List and generating the Discrete Event Simulation. "The SimEventListener 
pattern involves an event that has been executed by the Event List.  It consists of the 
source of the event (the SimEntity [the Simkit specific object or class of  objects] that 
scheduled it) multicasting the same SimEvent to registered SimEventListeners" [Ref. 19].    
Hence, the capacity for an object to hear the event of another object is achieved through 
registration, as with the PropertyChange construct, but in the SimEventListener case, far 
more can be accomplished after the event is fired, because notification, in this case, also 
effects the execution of further actions within the listening class[es] or component[s].  
The details are as follows, but the key point to be made is that the SimEventListening 
pattern is what allows a Simkit simulation's components to interact simply through the 
transfer of information from one entity to another, rather than through explicit commands 
issued from one entity to another: it is the glue of loose-coupling.   
The SimEventListening pattern manifests the DES process described above as 
follows.  Events, or specifically "SimEvents," are placed on the Event List when a 
component object or class (a SimEntity) within the simulation executes the method 
waitDelay(String, double, object).  The "String" within the method invocation is the 
name of the event to be placed on the event list.  The name of the event that shows up on 
the list has a precise correspondence to the name of the method that executes it; the 
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execution method is the name with a "do" in front of it—for example, an "Arrival," as 
above, is actually executed within the code by actions programmed within a method 
called "doArrival."   The "double," a number, is the time until the named event will 
occur—which is to say the time from the moment at which the waitDelay method is 
called or executed.  The "object" argument within the method invocation (which is not 
required) allows specification of exactly which SimEntity is scheduled to undergo the 
scheduled event. When the named event is executed, any other component within the 
simulation that is both registered as a SimEventListener to the component that has 
executed the event and has an execution method with the same name (with the "do" 
attached) as the method being executed, will take whatever action is indicated in its own 
"do" method.  If an object was specified in the waitDelay scheduling method, then that 
object is passed along to all listeners, thereby allowing the listeners to act upon or react to 
that object.    
An example of this pattern from the Force Protection simulation is the way in 
which contacts are detected and evaluated.  A contact's arrival into the river of the 
simulation is effected by a doArrival method.  Within the doArrival method a contact is 
"started" which means a doStartMove event is scheduled via the waitDelay method.  The 
actual call is something like: waitDelay("StartMove",0.0,contact).  Once the starting 
maneuver event is executed, components registered to hear it, that also have a 
doStartMove method, will be passed a reference to the contact that has started its move.  
In particular, the component that is monitoring all river traffic (the PBController) now 
has the capacity to know everything about the contact that can be known through 
invoking the contact's native methods—to include its position and motion vector.  With 
that information the PBController can determine whether or not the contact is a threat, 
and whether or not a Patrol Boat needs to be dispatched to intercept it.  How the 
evaluation and interception occur is largely the topic of chapter three; the point to be 
demonstrated here is that the loose coupling of the contact with the PBController is made 
possible through the SimEventListening pattern, and that loose coupling is sufficient to 
the task of generating the event list of a DES. 
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C. MULTIPLE SERVER QUEUES AND MOVERS  
The above basic Event Graphs and the Event-Based programming segments they 
depict represent the critical conceptual building blocks of the PatrolBoat simulation.  The 
foregoing discussion described the mechanics of Discrete Event Simulation and 
demonstrated the tools for presenting such a simulation’s abstraction.  The interest here is 
in presenting the model types that will be brought together to form the Force Protection 
simulation.  The driving model of the simulation is the Multiple Server Queue, presented 
in Event Graph abstraction above.  The Server model is the driver for the Force 
Protection model because waterfront force protection assets are easily cast as Servers, 
with incoming Threats as their customers.  Upon the framework of the Multiple Server 
Queue will be set “Server” and “Customer” objects (the PatrolBoat and Threat objects), 
which are kinds of Movers.  Mover objects are objects or SimEntities within the Simkit 
package that allow for more complex actions and interactions of and between (or among) 
the queuing model’s components.  By embedding the dynamic interaction of Simkit 
Movers within the Multiple Server Queuing model, a reasonable approximation of 
waterfront Force Protection scenarios is achieved. 
  Law and Kelton crystallize the queuing model in terms now, at least in part, 
familiar: “A queuing system is characterized by three components: arrival process, 
service mechanism, and queue discipline”[Ref. 10; p. 95].  The first component has 
already been essentially described by way of the its Event Graph.  The critical issue is the 
timing of arrivals, the question of how and when customers enter the system.  In the case 
of unpredictable terrorist attacks, the arrivals must be random, hence the inter-arrival time 
(tA) must be a random variable—which is easily set and easily changed in the input to the 
simulation.  According to Law and Kelton  
the service mechanism for a queuing system is articulated by specifying 
the number of servers . . . whether each server has its own queue or there 
is one queue feeding all servers, and the probability distribution of 
customers’ service times[Ref. 10; p. 95].    
The Force Protection model is slightly more complex, since it must involve 
service predicated upon assessment of prospective customers (i.e. threats) before they are 
admitted as customers.  Whereas in the basic model any object in the queue is and 
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remains a customer, in the Force Protection model, evaluation and prioritization will 
intrude upon the normal service routine.  The model must allow for the most obviously 
threatening customers to be serviced first, and allow for the interruption of a service if the 
current customer ceases to be a threat.  In other words, the Force Protection adaptation of 
the basic service model is a completely dynamic one.  The last component of the queuing 
system, queue discipline, is “the rule that a server uses to choose the next customer from 
the queue (if any) when the server completes the service of the current customer”[Ref. 
10; p. 95].   It is already clear that the Force Protection model will use “priority” 
discipline in selecting the next customer—with highest priority going to the most 
threatening (the closest) Mover object.  What is also clear is that not every service that is 
started will reach a “normal” conclusion simply based upon a service time.  Service time 
determination and the means of setting customer queuing priority, are highly dependent 
upon the nature of Mover objects.  Hence a brief discussion of movement is required. 
 
It is clear that simulation of moving boats must be able to incorporate movement 
and some sort of detection: the capacity for boats to move and for operators (either in the 
boats or in the control tower or elsewhere) to “see” other boats on the water.  Some of the 
"detection" necessary in the model is achieved simply through the "listening" processes 
within Java and Simkit described above.  Other detection is less direct and dependent 
upon the relative position of objects within the simulation space.  Simkit provides for 
movement and detection through its Mover and Sensor classes, which apply 
straightforward mathematics to allow for modeling dynamic, interactive systems like the 
waterfront scenario being modeled herein.  Movement is easily described over time as a 
function of speed and direction (i.e. a velocity vector).  However, because discrete event 
simulations do not move forward in time steps but rather event steps, modeling 
movement in such simulations introduces the challenge of keeping track of the position 
of an object that is constantly changing between events.  This challenge is met through an 
“implicit state” of the state variable.[Ref. 20]  The implicit state notion rests upon the 
simple fact that position is a function of velocity multiplied by time: “a moving entity 
starts its move at some initial position x0 + (t – t0)v.  Equivalently, the location of the 
entity s time units after it began its movement is x0 + sv"[Ref. 20].  In other words, if an 
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object’s initial position and velocity—which of course means both speed and direction, 
since it is a vector—are known, along with its start time, then its position at any known 
time after the start time can be calculated at any time, given there has been no change in 
its velocity.  The value of the implicit state to the discrete event simulation environment 
follows: changes in an entity’s movement are simply events or methods that determine 
the future position of the entity until its next movement event.  The implicit state is 
highly leveraged within Simkit in the detection process, implemented through "Sensor" 
objects by way of third party "Referees" and "Mediators" that prevent the Sensors from 
knowing ahead of time when a Mover is going to enter its range. 
The Patrol Boat movement application is somewhat different from the sensing 
problem, but it, as well, relies upon the implicit state.  A Patrol Boat's job, particularly in 
the line of sight situation on the Sub Base Bangor riverfront, is not one of sensing, but of 
evaluating and intercepting.  Evaluation is easily accomplished and does not involve 
movement per se, but interception of threats does.  In reality, intercept points are 
calculated using something like a maneuvering board or its electronic equivalent, by 
determining a target's relative speed and direction over time and then adjusting one's 
course and speed in order to intercept.  The development of a target's relative behavior 
with time is a time-stepped phenomenon and therefore not applicable to the discrete event 
construct.  Nonetheless, given a target's initial position and vector—which is to say that 
target's position and vector at the instant of a specific event—the implicit state allows for 
the calculation of an intercept point which will remain valid at least until the next event 
of the threat in question, as long as an intercept speed is defined.  If an intercept speed is 
not defined, the basic motion equation, ( ) tvxtx *+= 0)( , will end up with two unknowns, 
velocity and time.  The ability to calculate an intercept point is essential to the simulation 
of the Patrol Boat movement, since interception is precisely what defines the "service" 
within the dynamic service model being developed.  The mathematics underlying the 
intercept algorithm—code available in Appendix A—is as follows, for an intercept by 
Patrol Boat, PB, of a threat, C, with initial conditions at a doStartMove event of C that is 
heard by PB: 
Givens: 
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Using the basic motion equation for both the Patrol Boat and the threat, set their 
positions at time, t, equal to solve for the time at which they will be in the same place, 
given a Patrol Boat intercept speed: 
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Now, with the unknown, time, removed, the necessary intercept velocity can be obtained 
by using straightforward vector resolution.  First, for simplification of terms, since the 
Threat velocity and both vessels' initial positions are known, we can define a constant, 
)()( CydxCxdyk -= .  Also, since the Patrol Boat's velocity is in part what is being 
solved for—that is, its direction or course to intercept—we must define an intercept 
speed, S, the magnitude of the intercept vector, so that the Pythagorean theorem can be 
invoked, leaving as a single unknown either of the intercept vector's component vectors.  
Here, as in the algorithm within the simulation coding, the X-component is solved in 
terms of the Y: 
              (5)       222
222
int PBySPBxSVPByPBx -=Þ==+  
Further algebraic manipulation yields: 
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             (6)        ( ) 0)))((())((2 222222 =-+++ SdykPBykdxPBydxdy  
Which can be solved using the quadratic formula , with 
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At this point the Patrol Boat's vector for intercept is fully determinable, but for Simkit 
purposes, the key value is that of time to intercept, which is obtained using (3). The time 
to intercept is used in the basic motion equation ( ( ) tvxtx *+= 0)( ) for the Threat to 
solve for the intercept point—that point at which, at time = time in the future, the Threat's 
position will equal that of the Patrol Boat.   Actually solving for the Patrol Boat's vector 
is unnecessary within the simulation program, since an order to move to the intercept 
point will necessarily result in that vector's generation—in fact, Simkit will provide the 
vector if desired, through a method invoked upon the Patrol Boat object upon its 
execution of the event that moves it to intercept.   
 It should be noted, at this point, that certain conditions make an intercept 
infeasible.  There are three types of intercept infeasibility that are apparent in the 
development above.  The first is infeasibility because there simply is no point at which a 
Patrol Boat and target's motion equations will be equal.  This is indicated by an 
imaginary root—a negative result under the radical of (7).  The second infeasibility 
results when a calculated intercept point, while it exists, is outside the defined problem 
space—e.g. an intercept point that is actually on land.  The third infeasibility is the case 
where time to intercept, from (3), is negative, indicating that the intercept point as already 
been passed. 
Infeasibilities notwithstanding, once the intercept point of an incoming threat has 
been determined, the pieces of the dynamic service model are assembled.  Incoming 
contacts that are evaluated as threats are the customers, the Patrol Boats are the servers, 
and the intercept maneuvers derived from the calculation above are the services.  Unlike 
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typical service models, customers do not stand still if they join the queue, and service 
times are not simply the realization of a random variable, but are rather a function of the 
distance separating the server from the customer at the start service.  Because of possible 
speed mismatches, there is also the possibility of service infeasibility—i.e. the inability 
for a Patrol Boat to intercept at its intercept speed, given a high Threat speed—which 
doesn't exist in the standard service model.   
The foregoing has presented the tools and modes of presentation of discrete event 
simulation of a service model with movement.  The following chapter applies the 
principles herein discussed to the waterfront Force Protection problem and outlines the 
development of the model generated to simulate it, using Event Graphs.  It also addresses 
the issues of verification and validation and the use of graphics, in preparation for model 
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    III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. MODEL COMPONENTS 
The components of the Force Protection simulation are, in true object-oriented 
fashion, made up of entities that represent the basic "artifacts" of the waterfront at 
SubBase Bangor—or, really, any port—and the command structures that direct them.  
The main objects of the simulation are boats, both Patrol Boats and other boats on the 
river.  These objects are extensions of Simkit's BasicMover class, and are called 
TypedBasicMovers, to allow for differentiating, for example, patrol craft from threat craft 
within the code.  The components of the simulation program are the classes that generate, 
command and move the TypedBasicMovers.  Certain components need to know what 
certain other components are doing, so they are set up as SimEventListeners to their 
"subordinate" classes.  The figure below is a black-box depiction of the simulation's 
major components and their interactions, with SimEventListeners connected by the bold 
arrows.  This bird's-eye view shows the essential structure of the entire simulation model; 
the event graphs that follow actually reside, conceptually, within the component blocks. 
 


















The arrowheads show the direction of flow of information in the 
SimEventListening pattern of the simulation.  For example, the Contact Generators listen 
to the Arrival process and the PBController listens to individual contacts, and to all Patrol 
Boat Mover Manager (PBMM) components.  The component-based design of the 
simulation above is enough to describe the general processes of the model.   Arrival 
Processes provide inter-arrival times at which different kinds of contacts are generated 
within a contact generation component.  Each contact is assigned to a movement-
managing component, dependent upon its type, and is made known to the PBController 
through the PBController's being made a SimEventListener to the contact—the reality 
simulated here is that the Arrival Process signifies a contact's arrival into the field of view 
of the controlling station.  Patrol Boat objects are instantiated and assigned to PBMM's 
and are, as well, put under the supervision of the PBController.  Finally, each simulation 
has a TerroristMoverManager component that carries out a specific kind of attack upon 
the Delta pier.  The terrorist objects are movers like the others and are, therefore, also 
assigned mover managers and registered with the PBController, though the PBController 
is not told they are any different from any other contact on the river.   The listening 
pattern allows mover manager components to hear movement events so as to schedule 
follow-on movement events while simultaneously allowing the PBController to hear 
those same movement events so as to respond to them. 
 
1. Mover Managers  
There are four kinds of Mover Managers implemented within the simulation: a 
RandomLocationMoverManager for Randomly maneuvering TypedBasicMovers—called 
Loiterers—a basic PathMoverManager transiting or "Passerby" TypedBasicMovers, a 
TerroristMoverManager for "Bad Guy" TypedBasicMovers, and a PatrolBoatMover 
Manager (PBMM) for Patrol Boat TypedBasicMovers.  The basic mover manager 
components of the simulation are very straightforward but worth showing, since they 
demonstrate the way in which the dynamic service model is set and maintained in 
motion.  The basic idea of all types of mover managers is that they move their constituent 
objects from one point to another.  The differences among the different types of 
Managers result from differences in the behaviors of the various TypedBasicMovers.  For 
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example, the difference between random movement and path movement is simply that a 
RandomLocationMoverManager generates a new random location as the next destination 
point for its Mover upon its arrival at a location (which results in endless movement, 
unless interrupted), whereas all other Mover Managers move their constituent Movers 
through a sequence of pre-set waypoints.  In either case, the Mover—or within the 
context of this simulation, the TypedBasicMover—is started and then redirected upon 
every execution of its doEndMove method.   
Figure 6.   PathMoverManager Event Graph (major elements) 
 
A few additional Event Graph conventions in this and the following applications 
need to be explained.  The labeling techniques used in the above Event Graph (Figure 6) 
will be used in all the graphs that follow.   The items within the parentheses appended to 
the class names on the top of the event graphs, are objects that are "handed" to the 
component upon its instantiation, through its constructor.  Once the component has the 
objects, it can directly invoke methods or perform operations upon them.  The names are 
included in the event graphs to show how direct invocations upon an object can be made 
within the depicted classes.  For example, the fact that the PathMoverManager is handed 
a reference to the Mover it will control ("m") and that Mover's list of waypoints ("v") 
allows the PathMoverManager to invoke the Mover's moveTo method directly 
(m.moveTo), and to iterate through its Mover's waypoints. Conditions on arcs are labeled 













* Condition A: if “m” has another way 
point in “v,” its waypoints vector
Iterate through v 
to find way points
Iterate through v 
to find way points
[m]
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and then explained below each graph to save space.  As usual, changes in state are 
indicated in curly braces below applicable methods.  Herein, important processes that are 
executed within a method will also be indicated within those curly braces.  The brackets 
below certain scheduling edges indicate a parameter that is being passed from a 
scheduling method to the method being scheduled—this corresponds either to a direct 
method invocation that requires the parameter or to the object instantiated within the 
waitDelay construct discussed above.  Perhaps most importantly, it must be understood 
that the event graphs shown here are not comprehensive in that they do not show every 
single method or capture every action or every change of a state variable within the 
classes or components they represent.  The graphs are designed (as always) to capture the 
main flow of events in the DES while limiting the complexity of their presentation.
 As for the details of the PathMoverManager event graph, the most important thing 
to note is that the key event in the class is the doEndMove event, because it is here that, 
once the manager has been started, it takes all follow-on actions.  This same idea is  
elaborated in the PBMM.  The graph also visualizes the SimEventListening pattern, in 
that the doEndMove method of the PathMoverManager is executed upon its "hearing" the 
same event executed by its Mover.  Once the PathMoverManager has been added as 
SimEventListener to its Mover—which actually happens in another class, as will be 
seen—it will hear and therefore be able to react to any of its Mover's events within its 
own event of the same name.  Specifically, then, after the PathMoverManager has been 
started, through an invocation of its start command (shown as a method for ease in 
following the flow of events), it checks to see if its Mover has any waypoints and, if so, it 
directs the Mover to its first waypoint.  The m.moveTo(some point) command results in 
an immediate doStartMove for the mover and a scheduled doEndMove for the same 
mover with a time delay equal to the time it will take for the Mover to move from where 
it is to its first waypoint, based upon the simple motion equation.  The 
PathMoverManager does not, in fact, have a doStartMove method within it; it merely 
effects movement through the moveTo command.  The method has been included within 
the event graph to make the movement process more apparent.  When the Mover 
executes its doEndMove method, upon arrival at a waypoint, that event is heard by the 
PathMoverManager, which then iterates through the waypoint vector again and issues 
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another moveTo event, if there are more waypoints in the vector.  Note that if there are no 
more waypoints, the PathMoverManager simply does nothing, hence the Mover will 
remain at rest.  The stop command (again shown as a method), therefore, is merely 
included to allow a direct intervention in the pre-set movement of a Mover.  
 
2. Contact Generators  
There are two kinds of contact generators in the model, each corresponding to a 
specific kind of TypedBasicMover.  One is a LoitererGenerator, which generates 
TypedBasicMovers of the PlatformType "Loiterer," and the other is a PasserbyGenerator, 
which generates TypedBasicMovers of the PlatformType "Passerby."  Either type of 
contact is generated at a random "Y" position—the Y-axis being the East-West axis or 
"across" the river from the pier—on either end (north-south axis) of the river zone, and 
given a uniform random speed between zero and thirty-five knots.  The only difference in 
the generators is the kind of Mover Manager to which it assigns its respective 
TypedBasicMover.  A Loiterer is a randomly moving contact, meant to represent a 
fishing boat, or a recreational craft moving around in the vicinity of the pier.  
Consequently Loiterers are assigned to a RandomLocationMoverManager that simply 
moves its Loiterer randomly from point to point within the river bounds.   Loiterers will 
often cross into the exclusion zone and be evaluated as threats that need to be intercepted.  
They are distractions for the Patrol Boats, but since there is no way of knowing which 
contacts might be Terrorists, Loiterers must be taken seriously.  This is an important 
feature of the model, because the primary goal of the simulation is to come up with some 
way of effectively preventing a terrorist attack without knowing for sure whether or not 
any given boat may contain a terrorist.  A Passerby is a contact that moves in a straight 
line from one edge of the river boundary to the other, passing by the sub-base.  A 
Passerby is a transiting craft that is generally not going to drive inside the exclusion zone 
in the river and consequently will rarely be evaluated as a threat, but its randomly 
assigned Y-position is allowed to fall inside the exclusion zone by up to fifty yards, so 
one may well end up being intercepted as a threat upon occasion.  Since the contact 




Figure 7.   LoitererGenerator Event Graph (major elements) 
 
An element shown for the first time in this event graph (Figure 7) is the River 
object, which is part of what allows the Patrol Boat simulation to be displayed 
graphically. The simulation's "river" is passed into the Lo itererGenerator and other boat 
components of the simulation so their movement may be seen as the simulation runs.  
The graphical display of the simulation will be discussed below, and has nothing to do 
with the way the simulation, per se, works.  Since LoitererGenerator is a 
SimEventListener to an ArrivalProcess—not shown in itself, but the same as shown in 
Chapter Two—it has its own doArrival method, which is executed upon an Arrival event.  
Hence "generation," which is merely instantiation of an object of a specific type, takes 
place upon an Arrival.  Upon instantiation within the doArrival method, the new Loiterer 
object is assigned a mover manager, made known to the PBController, and started upon 
its randomly moving way.  The doEndMove method is heard from the instantiated 
Loiterer object, since the LoitererGenerator is a SimEventListener to its Loiterer—the 
Generator is the "this" of "l.addSimEventListener(this)."   Upon a Loiterer's execution of 
LoitererGenerator(PBController pbc, River r)
Arrival
Random speed, Random  pos
















an EndMove after it has been intercepted—a condition known through a Boolean method 
invoked upon a TypedBasicMover—the LoitererGenerator essentially removes all 
records of it, except its graphical depiction.  The graphical depiction of the Loiterer is not 
removed from the simulation's display panel until its doDisappear method is invoked a 
short time after its interception. 
 
3. TerroristMoverManager 
The TerroristMoverManager component is an extension of the 
PathMoverManager class, specifically tailored to control terrorist or "Bad Guy" 
movement.  It is described separately to show more clearly how the main event of the 
simulation—the terrorist attack—is effected.  It is the component that executes terrorist 
attacks, by moving "Bad Guy" objects toward the High Value Unit (HVU). It is passed a 
TypedBasicMover of PlatformType either "Smart Bad Guy" or "Dumb Bad Guy," with 
its waypoints and a time until attack.  A Smart Bad Guy has two waypoints in its 
waypoint vector: the first with the same Y-position as its initial starting point and an X-
position that is the same as the X-position of the HVU, and the second set equal to the 
position of the HVU. Hence, a "Smart Bad Guy" transits parallel to the exclusion barrier 
at a low speed (like a Passerby) until directly opposite the pier, and then turns ninety 
degrees toward the pier and accelerates to maximum target speed.  A Dumb Bad Guy is 
more direct.  It is started at either end of the river, and simply drives straight toward its 
single waypoint, which is the location of the HVU.  Both kinds of Bad Guy have the 
High Value Unit's location as an ultimate destination, which differentiates their 










Figure 8.   TerroristMoverManager Event Graph (major elements) 
 
The TerroristMoverManager (Figure 8) component or class is very similar to the other 
Mover Managers, except that its movement is not activated directly by a "start" 
command, but rather by a doAttack method scheduled with a waitDelay method within 
the class upon the execution of the doRun method at the simulation's start.   Additionally, 
the TerroristMoverManager class, fires a doBoom event, indicating a terrorist has 
achieved its goal of getting to the HVU, if upon a doEndMove event it has no more 
waypoints and is still "active"—an active threat is one which has not been intercepted.  
The doBoom event is the source of the "terror" statistic defined in chapter Four. 
 
4. PBMM 
The PBMM—short for Patrol Boat Mover Manager—class does precisely what it 
says: it manages the movement of TypedBasicMovers of PlatformType "Patrol Boat."  In 
reality terms, a PBMM can be thought of as the captain or operator of a Patrol Boat.  In 
Simkit terms, it is an elaboration of the basic PathMoverManager that controls the 
movement of Passersby and Bad Guys of either kind.  The PBMM includes methods 
TerroristMoverManager(Mover m, Vector v, double attackTime )
Stop
Conditions: A: if “m” has another way point in “v,” its waypoints vector
B: if “m” has no more way points and is still active
doRun
( A)*
Iterate through v 
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specific to a Patrol Boat object, most importantly an "Intercept" method—which is not a 
"do" method, because it need not be heard.  The PBMM's normal mode is the patrolling 
mode: it moves a Patrol Boat through the waypoints of its set patrol pattern until it 
reaches the end, and then starts it over again, ad infinitum.  It "knows" that its Patrol Boat 
is in patrolling mode as long as it has not been assigned a target, which it checks upon the 
execution of each of its Patrol Boat's doEndMove methods.  If the Patrol Boat has ended a 
move without an assigned threat, the PBMM keeps moving it through its patrol pattern.  
The patrol pattern is only broken when the PBMM is given directions by the 
PBController to intercept a threat contact.  Upon the direction to intercept, the PBMM 
stops the patrolling pattern and moves its Patrol Boat TypedBasicMover to the intercept 
point it has been handed by the PBController.  Upon the execution of its 
TypedBasicMover's doEndMove method, when the Mover is not patrolling—indicated by 
its having an assigned threat object—the PBMM schedules a doEndIntercept method 
with a zero time delay, which is "heard" by the PBController through the 
SimEventListener pattern.  At the end of an intercept move, the PBMM will either be 




Figure 9.   PBMM Event Graph (major elements) 
 
As with the PathMoverManager, the doEndMove is the critical event of the 
PBMM, since that is where is does most of its evaluation and scheduling.  When a Patrol 
Boat is patrolling, its movement is indistinguishable from that of other Movers, except 
that it will re-start at the end of its waypoints as opposed to other Movers that just stop.  
This restart is accomplished through additional condition labeled "B" in the graph (Figure 
9).  What is very different about a PBMM relative to a PathMoverManager is that its 
normal movement cycle can be interrupted by the PBController through its invocation of 
the PBMM's "Intercept" method as shown.  The Intercept method receives the target to be 
PBMM(TypedBasicMover m, Vector v)
Stop
•Conditions:
A: if “m” patrolling and has another way point in “v,” its waypoints vector
B: if m patrolling but has no more waypoints in its patrol pattern or m has finished an intercept and there are no other immediate threats
C: if m patrolling but needs to intercept—this cancellation is executed automatically through a “stop” command given by the PBController
D: if not patrolling (i.e. completing an intercept) 
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intercepted and its location—this is the boat's operator being vectored to a specific target 
by the contact/strike coordinator.  It uses the intercept point location to invoke the 
moveTo  method on its Patrol Boat object and retains (through a setting method) the 
target reference so it can schedule a doEndIntercept upon that specific target, once the 
intercept move is complete and assuming nothing changes after the first command to 
intercept.  The cancellation—represented by the dotted line—from the Intercept method 
to the doEndMove is not explicitly executed in the PBMM, but is included to show that 
an invocation of the PBMM's Intercept method automatically stops the PBMM's Patrol 
Boat thereby canceling its previously scheduled EndMove, to allow redirection before 
completion of a planned maneuver.  If a PBMM's Patrol Boat gets to an EndMove event 
with a reference to a target still active, the PBMM, upon hearing the event, will schedule 
a doEndIntercept event with a zero time delay, passing along a reference to the target 
which has been intercepted to the PBController through the SimEventListening pattern.  
Movement after an EndMove event constituting an intercept is actually controlled via the 
PBController—which decides whether or not it still needs the PBMM for intercepting—
but the possible movements after such an EndMove and the logic that effects them are 
depicted in the PBMM event graph for sake of convenience and clarity.   
 
5. PBController  
The PBController is the coordinating component of the simulation.  It is the class 
that monitors both contacts and Patrol Boats and directs Patrol Boats based upon its  
evaluation of contacts within the river.  In reality terms, the PBController is like a 
combined contact and strike coordinator.  It tracks contacts and maintains what amounts 
to a status board of all activities on the river: lists of all contacts, all threats, all available 
Patrol Boats, and all intercept assignments.  It also determines whether or not a contact 
needs to be intercepted, which Patrol Boat will intercept it, and where that Patrol Boat 
needs to go to intercept—the algorithm for the intercept problem developed above resides 
within this class.  Because the PBController listens to all other components within the 
simulation and directs all interaction between Patrol Boats and contacts it is the 
component within which almost all of the simulation's statistics are gathered.  
34 
 
Figure 10.   PBController Event Graph (major elements) 
 
The PBController (Figure 10) is handed the list of its PBMM's for a given 
simulation scenario.  It is also a SimEventListener to its PBMM's and to every other 
contact that is generated within the simulation, as has been shown.  This means that the 
PBController can hear any SimEvent fired by any boat object in the simulation within its 
own methods of the same names.  The event that most matters is the doStartMove event 
of any non-Patrol Boat, because upon the execution of a StartMove event, a contact's 
movement information for its next leg of motion is available, through its various 
methods, to any object holding a reference to it.  This is how the PBController evaluates a 
contact to see if it is a threat.  If a contact is a threat, which means it is currently, or will 
at some point be, inside the exclusion zone of the river, then the PBController schedules a 
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doThreat event.  It is scheduled immediately if a contact is already inside the exclusion 
zone upon its StartMove—as is the case with a contact that is instantiated inside it or one 
which maneuvers inside after previously entering but before interception—or with a 
waitDelay equal to the time at which the contact will cross the line, as determined by the 
basic motion equation.  The canceling edge means the first step taken by the 
PBController, whenever any of its contacts maneuvers, is to cancel previously scheduled 
Threat events for that contact.  This allows for the re-evaluation of a maneuvering contact 
and is ignored if no Threat events have been scheduled for the contact that has started a 
move. 
The doThreat method is perhaps the most important of the entire simulation.  It 
takes in all the motion information for a contact and applies—through another method 
not shown, called getIntercept—the algorithm developed above to determine if an 
intercept of an identified threat is possible at the intercept speed set for a given simulation 
scenario. If not (condition D in Figure 10) it schedules—actually, again, through the 
getIntercept method—a doNonIntercept method with a zero time delay.   If so (conditions 
E or F), it determines the available Patrol Boat closest to the threat that can intercept it 
and invokes its PBMM's Intercept method.  If there are no feasible available Patrol Boats, 
it adds the threat to the threat queue—this is why the state variables change in different 
possible ways in this method.  It should be clear that a doThreat method within the 
PBController that yields a feasible intercept and an Intercept method within a PBMM 
will take place at the same simulation time, given there is a Patrol Boat available.  What 
may not be quite as obvious is that these coordinated actions represent the Start Service 
event of the dynamic service model. 
The doEndIntercept method of the PBController represents the End Service of the 
dynamic service model, but is not directly connected as in the general case shown in 
Chapter Two, because it is actually an event fired from the PBMM, and therefore only 
heard, rather than executed by the PBController.  The  PBController, the ultimate micro-
managing middle man, only schedules and records completion of service; it doesn't 
actually perform any!  Nonetheless, the doEndIntercept method accomplishes the same 
general tasks as an EndService: it takes statistics on service performance, and schedules 
follow-on services if necessary.  If a server (Patrol Boat) is "idle" it is sent back into its 
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patrolling pattern. The tone of the dynamic service model is apparent in the kill method 
invoked upon any threat whose "service" is complete.  The method actually resides in the 
TypedBasicMover class and simply stops a TypedBasicMover dead in its tracks and 
schedules a doDisappear with a pre-set waitDelay.  The delay is set to allow the 
graphical display to show a contact has been intercepted or killed before it disappears.  
Upon an intercept, the intercepted threat turns a dark color—magenta for non-Bad Guys; 
black for Bad Guys—and its image is held until the execution of the Disappear method, 
at which time the object disappears from the screen. The Disappear method is highlighted 
in the event graph to show it is actually a follow-on action performed outside the scope of 
the PBController. 
 
6. BreachSensor  
This component of the simulation is not in the block diagram above, because, 
although not in the SimEventListening pattern, it does serve an important purpose and 
does incorporate the FirePropertyChange construct.  BreachSensor is an extension of the 
Simkit BasicSensor.  It is used in this case simply to gather a statistic on the number of 
contacts that get inside a "breach range" or standoff range from the pier.  In other words, 
it is not really being used as a sensor but rather as an indicator of a "breach" event.  The 
breach range is set as the range of the sensor and can be easily varied.  The goal is to 
provide an additional measure of Patrol Boat performance to the measure of whether or 
not a terrorist has gotten all the way to a HVU.  The idea is that any contact within a short 
distance from a moored submarine represents a degree of failure in force protection, even 
if the threat is intercepted. 
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Figure 11.   BreachSensor event graph  
 
The MyBasicSensor class (Figure 11) listens to the doDetection method of its 
Referee object—an object used with Simkit sensing to coordinate targets and sensors that 
are registered with it via a Mediator—and upon execut ion of the method, it fires a 
PropertChange, simply incrementing the number of breaches for the run. 
 
B. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Face Verification and Validation: Assumptions  
An explanation of component design and interaction demonstrates how the 
simulation model is constructed, but model results are dependent upon what assumptions 
are made about model inputs, and whether or not those assumptions are reasonable and 
properly implemented.  Bratley, Fox and Schrage define verification as "Checking that 
the simulation program operates in the way that the model implementer thinks it does: 
that is, is the program free of bugs and consistent with the model"[Ref. 21; p. 8].  
Verification is essentially a coding check; it ensures that the model's constituent 
algorithms are doing their calculations correctly.  Simkit provides an excellent tool for 
verification in its "verbose" mode.  When Simkit's Schedule is set to verbose, it lists the 
current Event being executed in the DES, along with the Future Event List and the 
names, positions and speeds of all instantiated Movers.  This allows the programmer 
literally to step through a simulation run and ensure Movers are behaving as they are 
designed to behave.  Of particular importance in the simulation is the Intercept move. The 
BreachSensor       




underlying algorithm was verified both through the Event List output—that showed 
proper speed changes and that the Patrol Boat and target did in fact end up at precisely 
the same point—and by an independent spreadsheet implementation.  The model's 
graphical display was also an excellent tool for model verification.  A picture tells a 
thousand words, and a moving picture—in fact, a picture of Movers—exposes the 
functionality of a thousand lines of code.  With graphics one can easily and literally 
achieve "face verification" just by checking to see if everything "looks about right." 
Validation is a more elusive goal.  Department of Defense Directive 5000.59, 
DoD Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Management, defines validation as "the process of 
determining the degree to which a model or simulation is an accurate representation of 
the real-world from the perspective of the intended uses of the model or simulation"[Ref. 
22].   Bratley et al. define validation as "Checking that the simulation model, correctly 
implemented, is a sufficiently close approximation to reality for the intended application . 
. . no recipe exists for doing this"[Ref. 21; p. 9].   Probably the best that can ever be 
achieved, particularly in a data- less, exploratory model like this one, is "face validation."  
Nonetheless, a few points can point toward accuracy.  Firstly, the model is designed to 
allow for changes in model inputs, so that it is robust to varying scenarios and therefore 
can be adjusted to achieve increasing levels of validity.  Key parameters can be easily 
changed—and are, for analysis purposes, in the next chapter—to get a range of outcomes.  
However, certain vital behavioral patterns are held constant and need to be justified by 
being held up to reality.  First are the ArrivalProcesses for the contact generators.  The 
Arrival Processes are modeled essentially as Poisson processes.  As Ross points out, the 
Poisson process, a counting process which has exponentially distributed interarrival 
times, can be used in situations where a system starts empty and interarrival times are 
independent (the assumption of "independent increments"[Ref. 23; p. 251]).  The vital 
and unique[Ref. 23; p. 238] attribute of the exponential distribution that makes its 
application to the arrival process very reasonable is its "memory-less" property; the fact 
that at any point in time, the expected time until the next arrival is the same as it had been 
at time zero: 
The assumption of stationary and independent increments is basically 
equivalent to asserting that, at any point in time, the process 
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probabilistically restarts itself.   That is, the process from any point on is 
independent of all that has previously occurred . . . In other words, the 
process has no memory, and hence exponential interarrival times are to be 
expected.[Ref. 23; p. 256] 
In the model, inter-arrival times of the two Arrival Processes are generated from 
two different Gamma distributions.  There are no specific data of river traffic for the area 
adjacent to the Delta pier, so the model implements a more general form of the 
exponential arrival rate recommended by Ross and Law and Kelton[Ref. 10; p. 300].  
Both Arrival Processes in the model—for Loiterers and Passersby—use Gamma 
distributions with shape parameters equal to one, which are exponential distributions, but 
could be adjusted easily if future data indicated a more appropriate distribution shape 
within the Gamma family.  The model is meant to stress the capacity of Patrol Boats to 
respond to threats in very high traffic density (a conservative approach) so inter-arrival 
rates are relatively high particularly for Loiterers.  The mean arrival rate for Loiterers is 
0.125 (eight arrivals per hour), and that for Passersby is 0.5 (two arrivals per hour).  
These values are set to give "conservative" estimates of Patrol Boat performance, and are 
held steady while the parameter space of Patrol Boat configurations is explored. 
A second key characteristic of the model is how a contact is evaluated as a threat.  
As it stands, a threat—which is to say, a contact that will be intercepted if possible—is 
defined as any contact that crosses into the exclusion zone, which is established, in 
reality, by the Coast Guard and marked with yellow buoys.  According the algorithm, a 
Patrol Boat will never move to intercept a contact until it crosses the line, and when it 
does move to intercept it will always move at the same speed, regardless of contact 
characteristics.  The criterion for responding only with a violation of the exclusion zone 
was established based upon discussion with the CSG-9 security officer, and the uniform 
intercept speed was established based upon the fact that all threats must be treated as real 
threats.  
Another implicit assumption of the model is that the PBController has perfect 
information about certain characteristics of every contact on the river.  While it cannot 
know a contact's type—since that would be cheating—it does know everything about its 
location and movement.   It "sees" and can direct an intercept of all contacts immediately 
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upon their entering the two-mile by one-mile rectangle that represents the operational 
zone around the pier.   This assumption is supported by the fact that, in reality, from the 
control tower on Delta pier there is a full view well beyond the zone depicted in the 
simulation, and the entire operational area can be surveyed continuously.  In other words, 
this is a line of sight situation, where it is reasonable to leave out delays in detection time.  
Certainly, there is a case to be made for the low visib ility, bad weather situation, but that 
is not taken into account in the model.  The capacity to generate an intercept point 
immediately is actually more accurate than it may at first appear, since a maneuvering 
Patrol Boat, with line of sight, is capable of simply driving at a contact, making whatever 
course adjustments are necessary to achieve an intercept.  Were there truly the necessity 
for a maneuvering board type calculation to be done before an intercept course could be 
determined, the instantaneous solution would be unreasonable, but in this line of sight 
case, the movement is reasonable. 
 
2. Graphics 
The use of graphics in presenting the Force Protection simulation has already 
been mentioned in the description of component event graphs and in its value for model 
verification.  Two more points need to be mentioned.  First, the basic mechanics of the 
graphics, and second the value of graphics in the use of the simulation.   
There is one class within the simulation package, Patroller, that implements Java 
Swing.  That class is called the River, as mentioned above.  Within River, directions are 
given for drawing anything that should be visible on the river, and methods are included 
for adding TypedBasicMovers to the river.  In particular, the coordinate axes, the delta 
pier, the exclusion zone barrier and the breach range are permanently displayed on the 
panel (Figure 12).  TypedBasicMover objects are displayed after they have been added to 




Figure 12.   Graphical Display of Simulation with Notation Added 
 
The River panel is drawn or "painted" through the addition of another "loosely 
couple component," the Animation class developed by Buss.  Simulation animation can 
be turned on or off dependent upon what the model is being used for.  For production 
analytical runs, the graphics are best turned off to allow rapid replication.  For run-by-run 
intuitive analysis, the graphics are extremely valuable.  Even before statistics are 
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can give broad insights into the relative worth of different tactics.  Beyond that, it is re-
assuring for analyst and decision-maker alike to have a way of "seeing" simulation 
analysis results other than some output file filled with numbers. 
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IV. MODEL RUNS AND ANALYSIS 
A. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
1.  Fundamentals: Repeatability and Replication   
Before statistics are defined or gathered, two critical design elements, specific to 
simulation, must be established: replicability and repeatability.   An experiment is 
replicable if a number of observations can be taken under a given set of conditions.  It is 
repeatable if the conditions under which the data are collected can be reproduced. This 
Force Protection simulation experiment is replicable at two levels: within each design 
point, and across all design points of the experiment.  Each design point of the 
experiment runs a specific Patrol Boat configuration against the same range of terrorist 
attacks.  Each design point is run against each type of attack 500 times.  Each of the 500 
individual model runs is a replication of the simulation within a design point.  This is the 
first level of replicability within the experiment.  In order to make a true comparison 
among Patrol Boat configurations alternatives, the experiment must be repeatable.  That 
means each configuration or design point must be faced with the very same situations as 
all other design points.  For example, the 40th replication of design point eight against 
attack number three must present the same threat profile—the same number of threats in 
the same places at the same times—as the 40th replication of design points one through 
seven against attack number three.  This is repeatability.  After the experiment is repeated 
at each design point against all attacks, the results for a given attack across all design 
points is a single replication of the experiment.  This is the second level of replicability 
within the experiment.  A diagram may help to show what is meant by replication and 
repeatability in the context of the kind of experimental design employed to analyze the 






Table 1.   Representation of Repeatability and Replication within an Experiment 
 
Law and Kelton say that, in general, replicability  is achieved when: 
Each run uses separate sets of different random numbers. 
Each run uses the same initial conditions. 
Each run resets the statistical counters.[Ref. 10; p. 212] 
The assurance of separate sets of random numbers for each model run within a 
configuration run is achieved as described below, using random number generation 
capacities within Simkit.  The second two criteria for replicability are met through "reset" 

























Patrol Boat Parameters (inputs) Outputs for model run number
Entire column represents one 
replication of the experiment
Each number is the result of a single 
model run—one “replication” within 
one design point
Every output number within each column is a response to the same traffic conditions (Repeatability).  “#” represents statistical output, 
which means more than one number.  In fact, seven statistics are gathered for each model run.
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Simkit has a Schedule.reset() method which, when invoked, calls all other reset methods 
within the simulation thereby re-establishing initial conditions.  The simulation program 
itself contains a "Resetter" method that resets all statistical counters.  Replication is 
particularly important in this simulation because it is a "terminating simulation," which 
means it ends upon a specific event, rather than running long enough to reach some sort 
of steady-state condition. [Ref. 10; p. 502]  In particular, each simulation run terminates 
at a set time, after a terrorist attack has been attempted—successfully or not.  In a 
terminating simulation, the only way to arrive at good statistics (statistics with reasonable 
confidence intervals) is to take many observations, which is to perform many model runs. 
 The assurance of repeatability from configuration run to configuration run is 
achieved, in simulation, through the proper use of random numbers:  
The basic idea is that we should compare the alternative configurations 
"under similar experimental conditions" so that we can be more confident 
than any observed differences in performance are due to differences in the 
system configuration rather than to fluctuations of the "experimental 
conditions."  In simulation, these "experimental conditions" are the 
generated random variates that are used to drive the models through 
simulated time.  In queueing simulations, for instance, these would include 
interarrival times and service requirements of customers.  [Ref. 10; p. 583] 
The Patrol Boat simulation is a queueing system with randomly generated 
interarrival times, initial positions and initial speeds for Loiterers and Passersby.  The 
goal is to ensure that each Patrol Boat patrolling configuration is tested under the very 
same traffic conditions.  That goal is achieved through the use of Simkit's 
RandomVariate class that allows for specified seeded random number generation.  Every 
configuration run, which consists of many model runs or "observations" at a specific 
input setup or design point, iterates through the very same sequence of interarrival times 
and random location and speed assignments for all Loiterer and Passerby objects.  (In 
Table 2 below, we specify 500 model runs per configuration run.) Any differences in 
statistical output for a given kind of attack scenario, are the direct result of changes made 





The specific goal of this Force Protection experiment—that has simulation results 
as its data—is to find Patrol Boat tactics that are most effective against a range of 
possible terrorist attacks under similar (actually identical) traffic conditions.  Therefore, 
the experiment must first collect statistics that indicate Patrol Boat effectiveness.  Each 
experimental design point pits a specific Patrol Boat configuration against a specific 
attack configuration and collects the following statistics: the number of threats 
intercepted, the average range of a threat from the HVU at intercept, the average number 
of available PatrolBoats (read servers), the number of threats that could not be intercepted 
because of infeasibilities, the number of "terrors" or successful terrorist attacks on the 
HVU, the number of threats inside the "breach range" from the HVU, and the average 
number of threats in the threat queue.  All statistics are gathered by SimpleStats—the 
statistics gathering object in Simkit—instances that record FirePropertyChanges fired 
through the course of a simulation run. 
a. Number Intercepted 
The number of threats intercepted in a simulation run is a simple count (a 
"Tally" statistic) of how many threat contacts were intercepted.  Because of the 
repeatability achieved through the RandomVariate random number generation, this 
provides a baseline measure of relative performance from one Patrol Boat configuration 
to another. 
b. Range at Intercept 
The average range of threats upon their interception refines the measure of 
relative performance by providing a more qualitative measure.  All else being equal, a 
Patrol Boat configuration that intercepts at a greater range from the HVU is preferable. 
c. Number of Available Patrol Boats 
The number of available Patrol Boats is a time-varying statistic that 
measures Patrol Boat utilization, defined in the dynamic service model as the proportion 
of time a given configuration's Patrol Boats are actually moving to intercept threats.  This 
statistic speaks to efficiency, giving the capacity to get a sense of the point of diminishing 
returns in the number of Patrol Boats necessary adequately to defend the Delta Pier 
(under the attack assumptions of the model). 
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d. Number of Leakers 
The number of leakers is a tally statistic that records the number of threats 
that cannot be intercepted.  The three kinds of intercept infeasibility mentioned with the 
derivation of intercept formulae in Chapter Two are tracked individually, but only the 
total number is recorded.  Additionally, it is recognized that certain high speed randomly 
moving contacts will be "leakers" more than once in a model run, so a given leaker is 
only counted once.  That is, the "leaker" statistic is actually a "unique leaker" statistic. 
e. Number of Terrors 
As the number of threats intercepted is the coarse estimate of how well a 
given Patrol Boat configuration does against a given attack, the number of "terrors" is the 
coarse estimate of how poorly it does—or, conversely, how well a terrorist attack 
configuration does.  For each simulation run, the number of terrors will be less than or 
equal to the total number of terrorists in that run's attack.   
f. Number of Breaches 
The number of breaches is very similar to the number of leakers.  It is a 
statistic that tallies the number of threats that make it inside the stand-off range from the 
HVU.  It refines the "terrors" statistic by capturing the qualitative effectiveness of a 
Patrol Boat configuration in actually preventing a terrorist attack.  As mentioned above, it 
may be a bit naïve to claim victory in the case where a terrorist object is successfully 
intercepted, but only a few yards from the HVU, at which range it may well have been 
able to achieve its goal.  In any case, it is desirable that a Patrol Boat configuration hold 
as many contacts as possible outside the established stand-off range. 
g. Average Number in Queue  
The average number of threats in the threat queue—"in line" to be 
intercepted—is a time-varying statistic that gives a sense of the adequacy of Patrol Boat 
capabilities.  A higher average number in the threat queue indicates an inability of Patrol 
Boats to respond to all threats, suggesting vulnerability. 
3. Run Setup: Fractional Factorial Design 
This thesis does not analyze every possible combination of Patrol Boat parameters 
for every conceivable terrorist attack scenario, but it does provide an analysis of defense 
against some feasible attacks while varying specific Patrol Boat parameters of interest to 
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the CSG-9 security officer.  It is hoped that the reader will gain insights and, more 
importantly, see a demonstration of a basic methodology that could be used and/or 
expanded for future model analyses.  
Once output statistics have been defined, it is time to specify the simulation's 
experimental design.  The simulation runs are set up so that enough observations can be 
gathered to provided good estimates, while at the same time providing insights into the 
effects of changing a number of Patrol Boat input factors.  Factorial design provides an 
excellent vehicle for the kind of exploratory analysis that this model is meant to achieve.  
Specifically, two- level factorial designs allow for the analysis of two levels of a number 
of input factors simultaneously.  Though this design approach does not allow all possible 
levels of all possible factors to be analyzed, it does provide a very powerful means of 
identifying the factors whose "main effects"—independent contributions—dominate 
outputs.  As Box, Hunter and Hunter point out, these kinds of designs are exceptionally 
efficient and very practical:   
They require relatively few runs per factor studied; and though they are 
unable to explore fully a wide region in the factor space, they can indicate 
major trends and so determine a promising direction for further 
experimentation.[Ref. 24; p. 306] 
Because so many parameters can be varied in the Force Protection model, a two-
level factorial design is the ideal vehicle for showing its utility in providing insights into 
specific scenarios. In particular a two-level fractional factorial design will be used to 
allow for analysis of four different Patrol Boat factors with just eight design points.  As 
two-level factorial design limits the size of the factor space that can be explored, 
fractional factorial design limits the number of higher order interactions that can be 
explored.  This means that the design assumes a factor's effect in acting by itself—its 
main effect—dominates its effect when acting together with one or more other factors.  
This assumption can be justified by the fact that as the number of variables or factors (k) 
introduced to a model increases: 
at some point higher order interactions tend to become negligible and can 
properly be disregarded . . . there tends to be redundancy in a 2k design if k 
is not small—redundancy in terms of excess number of interactions that 
can be estimated and sometimes in an excess of number of variables that 
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are studied.  Fractional factorial designs exploit this redundancy. [Ref. 24; 
p. 374-75]  
The practical justification for using a fractional factorial design in this analysis is 
that the analysis is exploratory and more concerned with trends than point estimates.  
Additionally, the fractional factorial design in no way precludes analysis of higher order 
interactions, but rather can give insights to where they may exist, so that more focused 
analysis can be performed. 
Two levels (a high and a low) of four different Patrol Boat factors will be used 
against eight different terrorist attack configurations.  The Patrol Boat factors to be varied 
are: the number of Patrol Boats, with levels of 2 and 4; patrolling speed, with levels of 2 
and 5 knots; intercept speed, with levels of 15 and 25 knots; and patrol pattern, with 
"levels" of barrier (1) and "bow-tie" or race-track(2). The eight different terrorist attack 
configurations are comprised of attacks by either one or two terrorists: 1) one Dumb Bad 
Guy, 2) one Smart Bad Guy, 3) two Dumb Bad Guys in a coordinated attack, 4) two 
Dumb Bad Guys in a synchronized attack, 5) two Smart Bad Guys in a coordinated 
attack, 6) two Smart Bad Guys in a synchronized attack, 7) one Smart Bad Guy and one 
Dumb Bad Guy in a coordinated attack, 8) one Smart Bad Guy and one Dumb Bad Guy 
in a synchronized attack.  A coordinated attack is defined as one where both terrorists 
start from the same point at the same time.  A synchronized attack is defined as an attack 
where terrorists start from opposite ends of the river at the same time.  The following 
diagrams (Figures 13 through 16) are representative of different set-ups, though not all-
inclusive.  One point of interest is that patrolling stations for patrol boats are established 
so there is full "horizontal" coverage of the area in front of the pier regardless of the 


























Figure 16.   Coordinated Attack by One Smart and One Dumb Terrorist 
 
Patrol Boat values are notional, since this is a non-classified thesis, but are 
reasonable small boat values and tactics.  Terrorist attack scenarios are designed to 
address CSG-9 concerns, and are based upon the findings of the Cole report cited in 








than two if desired—to reflect the possibility that more than one boat may be used as 
evidenced by the 11 September coordinated air attacks. 
With all the pieces in place, the application of the fractional factorial experimental 
design to the Patrol Boat factors and terrorist attacks of interest results in an 8 x 8 matrix 
(Table 2). 
 
Table 2.   Fractional Factorial Design of Complete Experiment 
 
Here the column headings are attack type rather than run number.  Each output 
row of the earlier matrix represents one output element of this matrix, which is to say 
each element of this experiment matrix involves 500 runs of the model with a given 
Patrol Boat configuration against a given attack type.  Therefore, the entire experiment 
consists of 8 design points, yielding 64 multivariate data points or design observations, 
generated from 32,000 (64*500) individual observations or model runs.  Each 500 run 
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B. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Raw data from the model runs were collected in Excel spreadsheets.  There is one 
spreadsheet per design point.  Here (Table 3),  the raw data sheet for design point one is 
shown; all sheets are displayed in Appendix B. 




















dp1.1 mean 2.93988 13.4509 1.830053 0.004025 30.88577 957.3882 0.152305
sd 1.768872 3.781042 0.051879 0.046242 5.095964 86.19461 0.359676
var 3.128908 14.29628 0.002691 0.002138 25.96885 7429.511 0.129367
dp1.2 mean 3.661323 14.48297 1.838598 0.001172 30.18437 954.2404 0.861723
sd 1.632848 3.811472 0.050074 0.002704 5.220641 81.17603 0.345536
var 2.666192 14.52732 0.002507 7.31E-06 27.2551 6589.548 0.119395
dp1.3 mean 3.881764 14.41683 1.835858 0.00449 31.08617 954.6288 0.991984
sd 1.68028 3.702083 0.049546 0.049565 5.177821 83.28889 0.533925
var 2.823341 13.70542 0.002455 0.002457 26.80983 6937.039 0.285076
dp1.4 mean 3.336673 14.12024 1.833563 0.00309 31.42285 960.5784 0.637275
sd 1.758193 3.925712 0.050049 0.033851 5.381767 81.91754 0.61335
var 3.091243 15.41122 0.002505 0.001146 28.96341 6710.484 0.376198
dp1.5 mean 4.643287 15.47295 1.837511 0.009546 30.26453 956.5379 1.843687
sd 1.658921 3.904067 0.048999 0.08931 5.189014 90.34237 0.390159
var 2.752018 15.24174 0.002401 0.007976 26.92587 8161.745 0.152224
dp1.6 mean 4.521042 15.26052 1.838607 0.002538 30.30661 953.5084 1.851703
sd 1.648005 3.957133 0.048999 0.020218 5.232753 85.98333 0.372299
var 2.715922 15.6589 0.002401 0.000409 27.3817 7393.134 0.138607
dp1.7 mean 3.897796 14.52705 1.838172 0.017015 30.94188 953.5896 1.114228
sd 1.684913 3.894797 0.047951 0.120719 5.283397 83.8448 0.430953
var 2.838931 15.16945 0.002299 0.014573 27.91429 7029.95 0.185721
dp1.8 mean 3.857715 14.58918 1.836917 0.018639 30.998 956.0409 1.114228
sd 1.711582 4.034684 0.049164 0.144296 5.309497 82.83713 0.466743
var 2.929514 16.27868 0.002417 0.020821 28.19076 6861.991 0.217849
Ybar1 . 3.842435 14.54008 1.83616 0.007564 30.76127 955.8141 0.598823
S21 . 2.868259 15.03612 0.00246 0.006191 27.42623 7139.175 0.07346
Var(means) 0.315703 0.396126 8.93E-06 4.63E-05 0.204812 5.699677 0.081763
V1 3.183961 15.43225 0.002469 0.006237 27.63104 7144.875 0.155223
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The table shows the mean, standard deviation, and sample variance for each 
statistic for each Patrol Boat configuration against each of the eight types of terrorist 
attacks.  The labeling in the first column of the table corresponds to the elements of the 
8x8 matrix shown in Table 2.  For example, the numbers following the label "dp1.1" are 
the means, standard deviations and sample variances for all statistics collected from the 
500 model runs that pit the first Patrol Boat configuration (two patrol boats in barrier 
patterns, with patrolling speeds of 2 kts and intercepting speeds of 15 knots) against the 
first type of terrorist attack (one Dumb Bad Guy).  These values correspond to the upper 
left hand element (element 1,1) of the output matrix of Table 2. 
The last four rows of data in Table 3 are statistics for the Design Point as a whole.   
They are the statistics that provide the measure of how well the Patrol Boat configuration 
of Design Point One performed across the full spectrum of postulated attacks.  These 
design point statistics are used to generate the experiment's "metamodel" through 
regression analysis.  Each design point's statistics are the result of its 8 * 500 simulation 
runs.  Those statistics are, in other words, the collective result due to the changes in input 
variables (Patrol Boat parameters) that define each design point.  In the case of the 
"breach-count" statistic, for example, Ybar1.  is the average of all the mean values in the 
"breach-count" column (i.e. the average of 2.93988, 3.661323 . . . 3.857715), S2i . is the 
average of all the sample variance values, Var(means) is the sample variance of the 
sample means, and V1 is the total variance for the "breach-count" statistic for Design 
Point One—V1 = S2i . +  Var(means). The same statistics are gathered at each design 
point. 
 These design point summary statistics are used to implement the "Robust design 
philosophy" that considers both mean and total variance output values at each design 
point to select the best configuration option available.[Ref. 25 ]  The idea is that the mean 
output at a design point does not tell the whole story of a configuration's performance.  A 
design point that has a very desirable mean value might have much higher variance 
around that mean than another point with a slightly less desirable mean.  For example, 
consider a design point with a "breaches" mean of 3 and variance of 6 compared to 
another with a mean of 4 and variance of 2.  Assume the target mean value is 3 breaches.  
A comparison of the mean values would lead to the former point's selection, but the 
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robust design selection would be the latter, because it provides a close to optimal 
outcome with more certainty.  The total variance term in the Robust design scheme is a 
combination of variance inherent to the data within a design point (S2i . ) and the variance 
in the (mean) statistical output "across the design point" (V(mean) ).  This means the 
robust design allows for analysis both of output level and variance about an output level, 
so output selection is based upon more than a point estimate.[Ref. 25 ;  p. 289-90] 
The bottom line is that analysis of the eight Patrol Boat configurations simulated 
is performed by regressing the design point means and variances against the Patrol Boat 
input variables.  For a brief discussion of linear regression see Appendix C.  Regressions 
were performed for four output statistics: terrors, leakers, breachers, and range at 
intercept.  
 
1. "Terrors" Regression Models 
 The data for the models are: 
Table 4.   Data for Regression Model for "Terrors" Statistic 
For the general linear regression model, Y = bX, the "X" input variables, X1 
through X4, are numPBs, patSpd, intSpd and patPat, or number of Patrol Boats, patrolling 
speed, intercept speed and patrol pattern.  Those inputs are used to generate one 
regression model for the mean and another for total variance.  In all regression models, 
terms with p-values of .05 or less are considered statistically significant.  The regression 
model for the mean "terrors" produced the following results, with an R2 value of .974 and 
an adjusted R2 of .939, which indicates the model accounts for 94% of the variance in the 
“terrors” mean realized over the eight design points is accounted for by the model. 
numPBs patSpd intSpd patPat Ybar i. Vi
designPoint1 2 2 15 1 0.598823 0.155223
designPoint2 4 2 15 2 0.411323 0.188209
designPoint3 2 5 15 2 0.586172 0.162351
designPoint4 4 5 15 1 0.411072 0.186097
designPoint5 2 2 25 2 0.506388 0.161764
designPoint6 4 2 25 1 0.306613 0.157854
designPoint7 2 5 25 1 0.490606 0.170289
designPoint8 4 5 25 2 0.374248 0.183041
Terrors
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Table 5.   Regression Output for "Terrors" Mean 
 
The statistically significant variables are the number of Patrol Boats and Intercept 
speed.  For the range of attacks the probability a terrorist will succeed in an attack varies 
from a low of about .3 at design point six to a high of about .6 at design point one—a 
lower value is better.  Hence there is a one hundred percent improvement realized by 
varying the Patrol Boat configuration.  The magnitude of the coefficient values for the 
significant input variables indicates how one “unit” of change in the inputs affects the 
output.   Because the low and high variable levels were actually run set at +1 and –1 for 
uniformity’s sake, the total unit change for each input variable is two units.  This means 
that one Patrol Boat unit is one Patrol Boat (since its actual range is also two, 2-4); and 
one intercept speed unit is five knots (since its range is actually ten knots).  Therefore, for 
each additional patrol boat, an 8.48% improvement (or decrease in P(success) for the 
terrorists) is achieved; and for each five knot increase in intercept speed a 4.14% 
improvement is achieved.  The coefficients are negative because the input variable values 
are inversely related to the output value: increasing Patrol Boats and intercept speed 
decreases a terrorist attack’s likelihood of success. 
The mean regression results can be obtained or confirmed graphically, in a way 
which is perhaps more intuitive.  The following demonstrates a very powerful analytical 
technique: looking at the data!  A Graph of the terrors results for each design point versus 
each attack type clearly shows that design point six consistently yields the best result: 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.460655686 0.008994571 51.21486 1.64E-05 0.4320309 0.48928 0.432031 0.48928
numPBs -0.084841558 0.008994571 -9.43253 0.002525 -0.1134663 -0.056217 -0.113466 -0.056217
patSpd 0.004869113 0.008994571 0.541339 0.625889 -0.0237557 0.033494 -0.023756 0.033494
intSpd -0.041191759 0.008994571 -4.579625 0.019545 -0.0698165 -0.012567 -0.069817 -0.012567
patPat 0.008877129 0.008994571 0.986943 0.396437 -0.0197476 0.037502 -0.019748 0.037502
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Figure 17.   Graphical Confirmation of Mean Regression Result 
 
Figure 17 provides a summary of the relative performance of each design point across the 
range of proposed attacks.  The graph is generated from the raw data output of all design 
points (seen Table 3 for design point one, and Appendix B for all other design points).   
Further graphical displays confirm the significance of varying the levels of the 
two factors (number of Patrol Boats and Intercept Speed) identified as statistically 
significant through the regression output, and the concomitant insignificance of changing 
the levels of the remaining two factors (Patrolling Speed and Patrol Pattern). 
Figure 18.   Graphic Showing the Advantage of Four Patrol Boats Over Two 
 
P(terror) vs Design Point: 
















P(Successful Terrorist Attack) vs. Attack Type:























Figure 19.   Graphic Showing the Advantage of Higher Intercept Speed 
 
The increase in performance—decrease in P(terror)—is, perhaps, more obvious in Figure 
18 than Figure 19, but both graphs confirm that changes in these two factors produce 
clearly better outcomes.  The pictures tell in an instant what the regression model 
indicates through its t-statistics/p-values: it is always better to have more Patrol Boats, 
and always better to intercept at a higher speed. 
The graphs of the changes in P(terror) for changes in Patrolling Speed and Patrol 
Pattern show that they have no significant effect: 
Figure 20.   Changes in Patrolling Speed Have No Effect Upon Output 
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P(terror) vs. Design Point:














Pat Spd = 2
Pat Spd = 5
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Figure 21.   Changes in the Patrol Pattern Have No Effect Upon Output 
 
Once again these two graphs (Figures 20 and 21) capture the meaning of the regression 
model's t-statistics/p-values for the factors depicted. 
One final graphical display, a factor interaction plot, confirms the inclusion of 
only main effects in the regression model, by showing there are no interactions between 
the statistically significant factors.  This simple but powerful plot also provides a sense of 
the relative worth of the two significant factors.  The assumption that main effects 
dominate, which was made for efficiency's sake in approaching this exploratory analysis, 
is shown to have been a reasonable one: 
Figure 22.   No Interaction Between Significant Factors 
 
The fact that the two lines are virtually parallel indicates that the benefit of increasing 
intercept speed does not depend upon the number of Patrol Boats and vice versa.  
































Another way of looking at this is that, for each line in the plot, the slope change defined 
by its end points is dependent only upon the number of Patrol Boats.  Hence the two 
factors can be considered independently, which is very important in the analysis of the 
problem, since the opposite case—a situation where an interaction were present—would 
mean no conclusions could be drawn about the importance of either factor without 
considering both factors. 
One other insight gained from the interaction plot concerns the relative effect of 
the two significant factors upon the P(terror) measure of performance.  The change in 
P(terror) due to the change in the number of Patrol Boats can be measured horizontally 
across the plot from one end of each line to the other; and the change due to intercept 
speed vertically, from the corresponding end points of the separate lines: 
 
Figure 23.   Relative Effects of Significant Factors Upon P(terror) Outcome 
 
This analytical insight allows a decision maker to determine which of the two significant 
factors in the model yields the greater benefit, should a choice between the two be 
necessary because of some exterior constraint—such as budgeting.  In this case, the effect 
of increasing Intercept Speed is greater than that of increasing the number of Patrol 
Boats, which is generally consistent with the other measures of performance. 
Similar plots for all statistics analyzed are included in Appendix D.  In all cases 
the mean regression models are confirmed—including the omission of interaction terms. 
 
 The results for the total variance model had an R2 of  .683, with an adjusted R2 of 
.260:  

















Table 6.   Regression Output for "Terrors" Total Variance 
 
The low R2 value indicates that there is no significant variance in the terror 
statistic from design point to design point.  The variance in the terror statistic within the 
metamodel exists primarily within the individual design points rather than across them.  
This means that metamodel variance can be assumed constant, and that the mean value 
regression alone is the best ind icator of the optimal design point or Patrol Boat 
configuration.  Hence, for this measure of effectiveness, design point six, which has the 
lowest mean value, is the optimal configuration. 
 
2. "Leakers" Regression Models 
The data for the models are: 
Table 7.   Data for Regression Model for "Leakers" Statistic  
The regression model for the mean number of leakers across the design points has 
an R2 value of .992 and an adjust R2 value of .981, indicating the model explains virtually 
all the variance in the mean output. 
Table 8.   Regression Output for “Leakers” Mean 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.170603814 0.004064567 41.97342 2.98E-05 0.1576685 0.183539 0.157669 0.183539
numPBs 0.008196867 0.004064567 2.016664 0.137097 -0.0047384 0.021132 -0.004738 0.021132
patSpd 0.0048411 0.004064567 1.191049 0.319281 -0.0080942 0.017776 -0.008094 0.017776
intSpd -0.002366582 0.004064567 -0.582247 0.601271 -0.0153019 0.010569 -0.015302 0.010569
patPat 0.003237603 0.004064567 0.796543 0.483928 -0.0096977 0.016173 -0.009698 0.016173
numPBs patSpd intSpd patPat Ybari. Vi
designPoint1 2 2 15 1 14.54008 15.4322502
designPoint2 4 2 15 2 8.473697 8.54557976
designPoint3 2 5 15 2 14.88477 14.9307669
designPoint4 4 5 15 1 6.933116 7.04577238
designPoint5 2 2 25 2 9.19489 9.56027988
designPoint6 4 2 25 1 2.825902 2.80819265
designPoint7 2 5 25 1 8.372996 8.46694949
designPoint8 4 5 25 2 3.480711 3.24499689
Leakers
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%
Intercept 8.58827 0.214392521 40.05863 3.42E-05 7.905976965 9.270564 7.90597697 9.270564
numPBs -3.159914 0.214392521 -14.73892 0.000678 -3.8422069 -2.47762 -3.8422069 -2.47762
patSpd -0.170372 0.214392521 -0.794673 0.484865 -0.85266532 0.511921 -0.85266532 0.511921
intSpd -2.619646 0.214392521 -12.21892 0.00118 -3.30193887 -1.937352 -3.30193887 -1.937352
patPat 0.420247 0.214392521 1.960174 0.144828 -0.26204658 1.10254 -0.26204658 1.10254
62 
The same two input variables (number of Patrol Boats and intercept speed) are 
again statistically significant, and negative to show that with their increases, the number 
of leakers goes down.  With each additional Patrol Boat, the number of leakers is 
projected to decrease by 3.16; and with each 5 knot increase in intercept speed is it 
projected to decrease by 2.62. 
The regression model for leaker variance across all design points also has an R2 
value of .992 and an adjust R2 value of .981  
Table 9.   Regression Output for “Leakers” Total Variation 
The statistically significant variables within the variance model are the same as in 
the mean model, indicating that they drive metamodel variance as well as mean.  In this 
case the variance from one design point to another cannot be assumed constant, and must 
be considered in selecting most “robust” design point for this measure of effectiveness.  
A comparison of the regression models as well as of the data themselves shows that 
leaker variance tracks with its mean: as the mean goes up, so does variance, and vice 
versa.  This means there is no concern about choosing a “false optimal” design point by 
considering the mean alone.  This result strongly confirms the selection of the design 
point with best mean value, since that design point also has the lowest variance about its 
mean.  Again the best design point is Patrol Boat configuration number six. 
 
3. "Breaches" Regression Models 
The data for the models are: 
Table 10.   Data for Regression Models for "Breaches" Statistic  
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%
Intercept 8.754349 0.227279205 38.51804 3.85E-05 8.031043975 9.477653 8.03104397 9.477653
numPBs -3.343213 0.227279205 -14.70972 0.000682 -4.06651764 -2.619909 -4.06651764 -2.619909
patSpd -0.332227 0.227279205 -1.461758 0.239967 -1.05553165 0.391077 -1.05553165 0.391077
intSpd -2.734244 0.227279205 -12.03033 0.001236 -3.45754834 -2.010939 -3.45754834 -2.010939
patPat 0.316057 0.227279205 1.390613 0.258545 -0.40724721 1.039362 -0.40724721 1.039362
numPBs patSpd intSpd patPat Ybari. Vi
designPoint1 2 2 15 1 3.842435 3.183961
designPoint2 4 2 15 2 2.28482 2.161019
designPoint3 2 5 15 2 3.842184 3.266478
designPoint4 4 5 15 1 2.330912 2.105665
designPoint5 2 2 25 2 2.318136 1.848684
designPoint6 4 2 25 1 1.406563 1.264091
designPoint7 2 5 25 1 2.550852 2.072597
designPoint8 4 5 25 2 1.438377 1.343602
Breaches
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The regression model for the mean number of breaches per design point has an R2 
value of .976 and an adjust R2 value of .944.   
Table 11.   Regression Output for “Breaches” Mean 
Here, the model coefficients, that indicate the per unit change in the number of 
breaches, are smaller than the coefficients for the number of leakers, but that difference in  
magnitude corresponds with the difference in magnitude between the average number of 
leakers and breaches.  The number of Patrol Boats is still has the dominant effect upon 
the outcome.   
The regression model for the variation in the number of breaches across the 
design points has an R2 value of .970 and an adjust R2 value of .931. 
Table 12.   Regression Output for “Breaches” Total Variance 
The results for the “breaches” statistic of the metamodel are very similar to those 
of the “leakers.”  Both regressions yield good models, and the model results track each 
other exactly.  Again, the statistically significant variables in the Patrol Boat 
configuration are the number of boats and their intercept speeds; and again, because 
variance decreases along with the mean, the design point with the most favorable mean 
value also has the lowest variance about that value.  The best point for the “breaches” 





Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%
Intercept 2.501785 0.077842076 32.13924 6.62E-05 2.25405636 2.749513 2.254056 2.749513
numPBs -0.636617 0.077842076 -8.178315 0.003825 -0.88434544 -0.388889 -0.884345 -0.388889
patSpd 0.038796 0.077842076 0.498398 0.652452 -0.20893212 0.286525 -0.208932 0.286525
intSpd -0.573303 0.077842076 -7.364948 0.005174 -0.82103131 -0.325574 -0.821031 -0.325574
patPat -0.030906 0.077842076 -0.397029 0.717905 -0.27863402 0.216823 -0.278634 0.216823
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%
Intercept 2.155762 0.068965181 31.2587 7.19E-05 1.93628384 2.37524 1.936284 2.37524
numPBs -0.437168 0.068965181 -6.338966 0.00794 -0.65664611 -0.21769 -0.656646 -0.21769
patSpd 0.041323 0.068965181 0.599191 0.591275 -0.17815485 0.260802 -0.178155 0.260802
intSpd -0.523519 0.068965181 -7.591057 0.004743 -0.74299684 -0.30404 -0.742997 -0.30404
patPat -0.000816 0.068965181 -0.011838 0.991298 -0.22029457 0.218662 -0.220295 0.218662
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4. "Range at Intercept" Regression Models 
The range at intercept statistic is the mean range of individual run mean ranges.  
The data for the models are: 
Table 13.   Data for Regression Models for “Range at Intercept” Statistic 
 
The regression model for the mean range at intercept as a function of design point 
has an R2 value of .976 and an adjusted R2 value of .945.   
 
Table 14.   Regression Output for “Range at Intercept” Mean 
 
The statistically significant variables for the mean of this measure of performance are the 
same as for all others analyzed.  In this one case the model coefficients are positive, since 
a higher range at intercept is preferable.  With each additional Patrol Boat the intercept 
range increase by 11.8 yards, while with each 5 knot increase in intercept speed the range 
is move away from the HVU about 16 yards.  Given that the average range at intercept is 
over 900 yards from the HVU at all design points, it may arguable as to whether or not 
changes of less than 20 yards are significant.  In any case, a more desirable outcome is 
realized as a natural effect of improving other performance measures, whether this 
measure of performance is considered vital or not. 
The regression model for the variation in the number of breaches across the 
design points has an R2 value of .165 and an adjusted R2 value of zero—the Excel output 
is negative, but that is nonsensical.   
numPBs patSpd intSpd patPat Ybari. Vi
designPoint1 2 2 15 1 955.8141 7144.87482
designPoint2 4 2 15 2 984.8698 6393.87433
designPoint3 2 5 15 2 960.3437 6685.79177
designPoint4 4 5 15 1 982.0539 6405.11773
designPoint5 2 2 25 2 984.2688 6780.72977
designPoint6 4 2 25 1 1010.97 6744.33899
designPoint7 2 5 25 1 998.3512 6490.6863
designPoint8 4 5 25 2 1015.697 7005.47552
Intercept Range
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%
Intercept 986.54606 1.791654631 550.6341 1.32E-08 980.844209 992.2479 980.844209 992.24791
numPBs 11.85161 1.791654631 6.614897 0.007035 6.14976022 17.55346 6.14976022 17.55346
patSpd 2.5654697 1.791654631 1.4319 0.247582 -3.1363803 8.26732 -3.1363803 8.2673197
intSpd 15.775674 1.791654631 8.805087 0.003086 10.0738244 21.47752 10.0738244 21.477524
patPat -0.251179 1.791654631 -0.140194 0.89739 -5.953029 5.450671 -5.953029 5.450671
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Table 15.   Regression Output for “Range at Intercept” Total Variance 
 
As with the model for variance of the “terrors” statistic, this model result indicates that 
variance in the statistic across the experimental design points can be assumed constant.  
This leaves the design point with the most desirable mean as the most desirable design 
point.  Design point eight yielded the greatest mean range across the spectrum of 
proposed attacks, and is therefore the optimal design point for the “Range at Intercept” 
measure of performance. 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%
Intercept 6706.3612 135.0019365 49.67604 1.8E-05 6276.72434 7135.998 6276.72434 7135.998
numPBs -69.159513 135.0019365 -0.512285 0.643782 -498.79633 360.4773 -498.79633 360.4773
patSpd -59.593324 135.0019365 -0.441426 0.688783 -489.23014 370.0435 -489.23014 370.04349
intSpd 48.946491 135.0019365 0.362561 0.74097 -380.69033 478.5833 -380.69033 478.58331
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 V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.       ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS 
First, by way of a reality check, it should be recalled that the overarching goal of 
the Force Protection model's analysis is to provide insights into the effects of varying key 
Patrol Boat factors.  It is very important to recognize that the goal of this or any 
simulation can never be to provide the "right" answer to the question of how to deploy 
assets.  Regardless of the validity of any simulation, it can only produce results based 
upon how well input parameters represent reality.  Certain simulation parameters are 
simply unknown or random, such as arrival rates of contacts into the river, or the time of 
a terrorist attack.  These parameters must always remain estimates.  Other tactical 
parameters, such as the number of Patrol Boats, Patrol Boat intercept and patrolling 
speeds, and patrolling patterns, are policy parameters and therefore are "known."   Hence, 
while there can be a danger of looking to simulation outputs as some sort of Rosetta 
stone, which, if properly interpreted or analyzed will yield ground truth, it is also true that 
simulation results will provide very realistic estimates insofar as realistic values for any 
unknown parameters are used.  The simulation tool becomes more valuable as the 
intelligence estimates of its parameter space improve. 
That having been said, the results of the four statistical outcomes delineated above 
yield informative cumulative results and insights.  The most apparent conclusion is Patrol 
Boat configuration effectiveness is primarily a function of the number of boats employed 
and their intercept speeds.  In most cases, it seems that intercept speed is the most 
significant effect, though it is not exactly clear how the two variables’ relative worths are 
precisely determined—the factor interaction plots are a good start.  The interesting 
insight gained from this fundamental observation is that neither patrol speed nor the 
patrol pattern is significant.  The practical value of this result is that the simplest pattern 
can be selected and the most efficient patrol speed used.  Simplicity of pattern has the 
advantage of allowing a boat operator to expend most of his effort looking for threats 
rather than plotting his course.  As for patrolling speed, it may well be that cutting a 
patrolling craft’s speed by more than half will result in greater fuel efficiency and fewer 
68 
maintenance problems. In any case, the boat operators are not constrained to use a high 
patrolling speed.  
As for the optimal Patrol Boat configuration, three of the four statistical outputs 
analyzed yielded design point six as the optimal configuration.  Only the “Range at 
Intercept” statistic points to another (design point eight).   The graphs of relative design 
point performance show that these two design points (six and eight) consistently yield 
similar results, which stands to reason. Since the number of Patrol Boats and the intercept 
speed are the only two significant input variables, design points six and eight are really 
the same design point, since they alone both hold those variables at the same level.  
Because neither the patrolling speed nor the patrolling pattern is significant, changes in 
their levels have no significant effect upon outcomes.  Design points six and eight are the 
two configurations that hold both the number of patrol boats and their intercept speeds at 
their high levels.  They are, therefore, both the optimal configuration, since they both 
have four Patrol Boats with intercept speeds of 15 knots.  
 
B.         RECOMMENDATIONS 
The specific and limited recommendation derived from this exploratory analysis 
is to use larger numbers of patrol boats and higher intercept speeds.  It is further 
recommended that the patrolling pattern and patrolling speed be determined based upon 
practical considerations specific to waterfront layout—for patrol pattern—and Patrol 
Boat characteristics—for speed.  The more general recommendation is that the model be 
exercised further with more specific parameters determined by those tasked with the 
waterfront Force Protection mission.  The model has given very reasonable results with 
notional data.  It can be run locally with more sensitive data, and analyzed as 
demonstrated in Chapter Four, with the Excel Data Analysis Tool kit (or simply with 
“straight-stick” Excel graphics) generally available at government installations. 
 
C. FOLLOW-ON WORK 
Follow-on work is needed in two major areas: further software development, and 
more detailed analysis.  The model extends Simkit's Movers and movement in at least 
two significant ways: it adds an intercept capacity, which is critical in many operational 
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applications, and effects a kind of agency within Movers through the TypedBasicMover 
extension. That notwithstanding, there is much more work to be done.  The model was 
designed with loose coupling in mind, but there are many improvements to be made to 
allow more universal application.   The ideal goal is to allow the end user to define both 
the playing field and players of the simulation.  That ideal is currently only partially 
achieved.  Additionally, follow-on software work should focus on generating graphical 
output that can be incorporated with the graphical database developed by the Johns 
Hopkins APL.   Some very specific movement issues could be further developed.  In 
particular, time delays for detection and acceleration could be incorporated. Detection 
delays are easily added, but the acceleration problem is a significant one, since the 
computation of an intercept point requires the use of an intercept speed.  A multi-step 
calculation over time seems possible, but somewhat problematic.  In any case, it is a 
problem worth pursuing, since it would add a great deal of realism to the simulation. 
The exploratory analysis of the previous chapter provides good first level insights, 
but is not an exhaustive study of the feasible parameter space.  More detailed follow-on 
analysis should look more closely at response surfaces across a broader range of input 
parameters to provide more exact findings about how specific changes affect 
performance.  The linear regression models seem to capture a great deal of output 
variation, but different models, higher order terms, could be investigated.  An advantage 
of the fractional factorial design, is that the experiment need not be re-engineered to 
allow such deeper analyses.  It may well be that follow-on thesis work should be done 
using—rather than developing—this model at the classified level, so more specific 
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APPENDIX A. JAVA CODE FOR THREAT INTERCEPT POINT 
/**@param pb the PBMM that controls the PB to be used for the intercept 
     *@param threat the threat that needs to be intercepted 
     *@ return the Coordinate of the intercept 
     *This method determines whether or not a threat can be intercepted by 
     *a given PBMM. If so, it passes the intercept point and schedules the end of the 
     *intercept at the intercept time calculated within.  If not, it returns null  
     **/ 
       public Coordinate getIntercept(PBMM pb, TypedBasicMover threat){ 
         
        tX = threat.getVelocity().getXCoord();  
        tY = threat.getVelocity().getYCoord();  
        tXPos = threat.getCurrentLocation().getXCoord();  
        tYPos = threat.getCurrentLocation().getYCoord();  
        pBXPos = pb.getLocation().getXCoord();  
        pBYPos = pb.getLocation().getYCoord();  
        dX =  tXPos - pBXPos; 
        dY =  tYPos - pBYPos; 
        k = dY * tX - dX*tY;  
        //define constants of quadratic forumula to solve for y component of 
        //O/S intercept vector based upon intercept speed. 
        a = Math.pow(dY,2.0) + Math.pow(dX,2.0);  
        b = 2.0 * dX * k;  
        c = Math.pow(k,2.0) - Math.pow(pb.getInterceptSpeed(),2.0)*Math.pow(dY,2.0); 
        w = Math.pow(b,2.0) - 4.0*a*c; 
        if (w < 0.0){ 
            firePropertyChange("imaginaryRoot", imaginaryRoot, ++imaginaryRoot);  
            return null;  
        } 
        else{ 
            pbY1 = (-b +Math.sqrt(w))/ (2.0 * a);  
            pbY2 = (-b - Math.sqrt(w))/(2.0 * a);  
            time1 = dY/(pbY1 -tY); 
            time2 = dY/(pbY2 - tY); 
             
72 
            if ( (time1 >=0.0) && (time2 >=0.0)){ 
                interceptTime = Math.min(time1,time2); 
                intX = tXPos + interceptTime * tX; 
                intY = tYPos + interceptTime * tY;  
                Coordinate intPt = new Coordinate(intX,intY); 
                if (intX >= 0.0 && intX <= RiverData.RIVER_SIZE_X && intY >=0.0 && intY <= 
RiverData.RIVER_SIZE_Y){                     
                    return intPt; 
                } 
                else{ 
                    firePropertyChange("outsideRiver", outsideRiver, ++outsideRiver);                     
                    return null;                     
                } 
            } 
            else if (time1 >= 0.0){ 
                interceptTime = time1; 
                intX = tXPos + interceptTime * tX; 
                intY = tYPos + interceptTime * tY;  
                Coordinate intPt = new Coordinate(intX,intY); 
                if (intX >= 0.0 && intX <= RiverData.RIVER_SIZE_X && intY >=0.0 && intY <= 
RiverData.RIVER_SIZE_Y){                     
                    return intPt; 
                } 
                else{ 
                    firePropertyChange("outsideRiver", outsideRiver, ++outsideRiver);                     
                    return null; 
                     
                } 
            } 
            else if (time2 >= 0.0){ 
                interceptTime = time2; 
                intX = tXPos + interceptTime * tX; 
                intY = tYPos + interceptTime * tY;  
                Coordinate intPt = new Coordinate(intX,intY); 
                if (intX >= 0.0 && intX <= RiverData.RIVER_SIZE_X && intY >=0.0 && intY <= 
RiverData.RIVER_SIZE_Y){                     
                    return intPt; 
                } 
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                else{ 
                    firePropertyChange("outsideRiver", 
outsideRiver, ++outsideRiver);                     
                    return null;                     
                } 
            } 
            else { 
                firePropertyChange("interceptPassed", 
interceptPassed, ++interceptPassed);                 
                return null;                 
            } 
        } 
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APPENDIX B. DESIGN POINT DATA 



















dp1.1 mean 2.93988 13.4509 1.830053 0.004025 30.88577 957.3882 0.152305
sd 1.768872 3.781042 0.051879 0.046242 5.095964 86.19461 0.359676
var 3.128908 14.29628 0.002691 0.002138 25.96885 7429.511 0.129367
dp1.2 mean 3.661323 14.48297 1.838598 0.001172 30.18437 954.2404 0.861723
sd 1.632848 3.811472 0.050074 0.002704 5.220641 81.17603 0.345536
var 2.666192 14.52732 0.002507 7.31E-06 27.2551 6589.548 0.119395
dp1.3 mean 3.881764 14.41683 1.835858 0.00449 31.08617 954.6288 0.991984
sd 1.68028 3.702083 0.049546 0.049565 5.177821 83.28889 0.533925
var 2.823341 13.70542 0.002455 0.002457 26.80983 6937.039 0.285076
dp1.4 mean 3.336673 14.12024 1.833563 0.00309 31.42285 960.5784 0.637275
sd 1.758193 3.925712 0.050049 0.033851 5.381767 81.91754 0.61335
var 3.091243 15.41122 0.002505 0.001146 28.96341 6710.484 0.376198
dp1.5 mean 4.643287 15.47295 1.837511 0.009546 30.26453 956.5379 1.843687
sd 1.658921 3.904067 0.048999 0.08931 5.189014 90.34237 0.390159
var 2.752018 15.24174 0.002401 0.007976 26.92587 8161.745 0.152224
dp1.6 mean 4.521042 15.26052 1.838607 0.002538 30.30661 953.5084 1.851703
sd 1.648005 3.957133 0.048999 0.020218 5.232753 85.98333 0.372299
var 2.715922 15.6589 0.002401 0.000409 27.3817 7393.134 0.138607
dp1.7 mean 3.897796 14.52705 1.838172 0.017015 30.94188 953.5896 1.114228
sd 1.684913 3.894797 0.047951 0.120719 5.283397 83.8448 0.430953
var 2.838931 15.16945 0.002299 0.014573 27.91429 7029.95 0.185721
dp1.8 mean 3.857715 14.58918 1.836917 0.018639 30.998 956.0409 1.114228
sd 1.711582 4.034684 0.049164 0.144296 5.309497 82.83713 0.466743
var 2.929514 16.27868 0.002417 0.020821 28.19076 6861.991 0.217849
Ybar1. 3.842435 14.54008 1.83616 0.007564 30.76127 955.8141 0.598823
S21. 2.868259 15.03612 0.00246 0.006191 27.42623 7139.175 0.07346
Var(means) 0.315703 0.396126 8.93E-06 4.63E-05 0.204812 5.699677 0.081763
V1 3.183961 15.43225 0.002469 0.006237 27.63104 7144.875 0.155223
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dp2.1 mean 1.521042 7.61523 3.90508 0 31.46293 992.3243 0.01002
sd 1.23416 2.816376 0.030197 0 5.452251 77.09115 0.099697
var 1.523151 7.931976 0.000912 0 29.72704 5943.046 0.00994
dp2.2 mean 2.216433 8.490982 3.906153 0 30.88778 978.7149 0.689379
sd 1.352244 2.925003 0.03176 0 5.472038 76.71705 0.463212
var 1.828565 8.555641 0.001009 0 29.9432 5885.505 0.214566
dp2.3 mean 1.893788 7.871743 3.899301 2.73E-07 32.25852 982.6089 0.166333
sd 1.337872 2.807689 0.033242 6.11E-06 5.309999 79.63415 0.378101
var 1.789901 7.883116 0.001105 3.73E-11 28.19609 6341.598 0.142961
dp2.4 mean 1.523046 7.777555 3.900288 0 32.25852 995.4897 0.038076
sd 1.217744 2.763906 0.041766 0 5.396647 79.86006 0.201782
var 1.482902 7.639174 0.001744 0 29.1238 6377.629 0.040716
dp2.5 mean 3.288577 9.52505 3.904803 0 30.89579 978.1589 1.695391
sd 1.358038 2.864559 0.031397 0 5.397936 83.17954 0.510334
var 1.844267 8.205697 0.000986 0 29.13771 6918.836 0.260441
dp2.6 mean 3.276553 9.418838 3.90402 0 30.84369 981.2241 1.723447
sd 1.367902 2.810431 0.036631 0 5.457725 82.5569 0.478106
var 1.871156 7.89852 0.001342 0 29.78676 6815.641 0.228586
dp2.7 mean 2.276553 8.496994 3.904062 0 31.6012 985.4207 0.777555
sd 1.24009 2.707548 0.032566 0 5.551446 79.92628 0.430533
var 1.537823 7.330814 0.001061 0 30.81855 6388.211 0.185359
dp2.8 mean 2.282565 8.593186 3.903893 0 31.57515 985.0167 0.781563
sd 1.274683 2.967839 0.033127 0 5.39186 78.5618 0.423199
var 1.624816 8.808066 0.001097 0 29.07215 6171.957 0.179097
Ybar2. 2.28482 8.473697 3.90345 3.42E-08 31.47295 984.8698 0.411323
S22. 1.687822 8.031625 0.001157 4.66E-12 29.47566 6355.303 0.060474
Var(means) 0.473197 0.513954 5.7E-06 9.34E-15 0.333248 38.57139 0.127735
V2 2.161019 8.54558 0.001163 4.67E-12 29.80891 6393.874 0.188209
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dp3.1 mean 2.871743 14.14028 1.8374 0.001226 30.8998 967.6103 0.160321
sd 1.720297 3.821883 0.049928 0.003014 5.152492 86.03063 0.367271
var 2.959421 14.60679 0.002493 9.08E-06 26.54817 7401.269 0.134888
dp3.2 mean 3.559118 14.48697 1.843198 0.012113 30.31663 961.0372 0.815631
sd 1.698692 3.889195 0.048941 0.140274 5.214663 79.47004 0.388174
var 2.885554 15.12583 0.002395 0.019677 27.19271 6315.487 0.150679
dp3.3 mean 3.805611 14.89178 1.838992 0.002014 31.12425 957.7534 0.97996
sd 1.687507 3.796573 0.046642 0.010686 5.275216 83.19879 0.623824
var 2.847679 14.41397 0.002175 0.000114 27.8279 6922.039 0.389156
dp3.4 mean 3.396794 14.56513 1.837979 0.001562 31.42886 969.8448 0.643287
sd 1.750178 3.860685 0.048068 0.00323 5.221639 81.58087 0.662393
var 3.063122 14.90489 0.002311 1.04E-05 27.26551 6655.438 0.438765
dp3.5 mean 4.655311 15.60922 1.840242 0.002259 30.37275 958.7996 1.817635
sd 1.690223 3.818365 0.05098 0.020226 5.366239 82.76137 0.430757
var 2.856854 14.57991 0.002599 0.000409 28.79652 6849.445 0.185552
dp3.6 mean 4.657315 15.61323 1.840242 0.002259 30.36874 958.884 1.821643
sd 1.685278 3.819826 0.05098 0.020226 5.36165 82.86046 0.418273
var 2.840162 14.59107 0.002599 0.000409 28.74729 6865.856 0.174952
dp3.7 mean 3.895792 14.88577 1.841277 0.001526 31.00601 954.4103 1.082164
sd 1.697258 3.813548 0.046378 0.004028 5.324978 78.1647 0.477677
var 2.880685 14.54315 0.002151 1.62E-05 28.35539 6109.721 0.228175
dp3.8 mean 3.895792 14.88577 1.841277 0.001526 31.00601 954.4103 1.082164
sd 1.697258 3.813548 0.046378 0.004028 5.324978 78.1647 0.477677
var 2.880685 14.54315 0.002151 1.62E-05 28.35539 6109.721 0.228175
Ybar3. 3.842184 14.88477 1.840076 0.003061 30.81538 960.3437 0.586172
S23. 2.90177 14.6636 0.002359 0.002583 27.88611 6653.622 0.087095
Var(means) 0.364707 0.267172 3.63E-06 1.35E-05 0.170818 32.16972 0.075256
V3 3.266478 14.93077 0.002363 0.002596 28.05693 6685.792 0.162351
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dp4.1 mean 1.488978 6.164329 3.897723 0 31.30862 987.7685 0.004008
sd 1.181084 2.408371 0.033435 0 5.408693 77.20181 0.063245
var 1.394959 5.800251 0.001118 0 29.25396 5960.119 0.004
dp4.2 mean 2.344689 6.881764 3.896577 0 30.5992 976.4362 0.709419
sd 1.320759 2.546761 0.035509 0 5.445207 81.30257 0.454486
var 1.744404 6.485992 0.001261 0 29.65028 6610.108 0.206558
dp4.3 mean 1.875752 6.370741 3.894981 0 32.1523 979.0659 0.152305
sd 1.261331 2.512784 0.030843 0 5.400882 80.3636 0.365217
var 1.590957 6.314082 0.000951 0 29.16953 6458.308 0.133383
dp4.4 mean 1.511022 6.206413 3.892906 2.82E-06 32.37275 991.675 0.018036
sd 1.221206 2.534002 0.035348 6.30E-05 5.400556 76.33099 0.147521
var 1.491344 6.421164 0.001249 3.97E-09 29.166 5826.42 0.021762
dp4.5 mean 3.346693 7.783567 3.899175 0 30.62725 974.9802 1.669339
sd 1.308776 2.543053 0.030912 0 5.381933 85.87928 0.51179
var 1.712896 6.467119 0.000956 0 28.9652 7375.251 0.261929
dp4.6 mean 3.322645 7.951904 3.899218 0 30.76152 978.9052 1.693387
sd 1.285581 2.651379 0.030281 0 5.543298 80.51856 0.526579
var 1.652719 7.029811 0.000917 0 30.72816 6483.238 0.277285
dp4.7 mean 2.374749 6.977956 3.895178 0 31.62725 982.1045 0.795591
sd 1.23935 2.671716 0.032747 0 5.390135 80.47742 0.403674
var 1.535988 7.138067 0.001072 0 29.05355 6476.616 0.162952
dp4.8 mean 2.382766 7.128257 3.895927 0 31.55311 985.4959 0.821643
sd 1.26419 2.64719 0.034487 0 5.445853 76.02263 0.388402
var 1.598176 7.007614 0.001189 0 29.65731 5779.44 0.150856
Y4. 2.330912 6.933116 3.896461 3.52E-07 31.37525 982.0539 0.411072
S24. 1.59018 6.583012 0.001089 4.96E-10 29.4555 6371.188 0.057825
Var(means) 0.515484 0.46276 4.76E-06 9.94E-13 0.462401 33.93009 0.128273
V4 2.105665 7.045772 0.001094 4.97E-10 29.9179 6405.118 0.186097
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dp5.1 mean 1.406814 8.436874 1.89181 3.53E-04 31.40681 988.049 0.076152
sd 1.191011 2.976063 0.032411 0.001124 5.339934 79.05218 0.265508
var 1.418508 8.856951 0.00105 1.26E-06 28.51489 6249.247 0.070494
dp5.2 mean 2.172345 9.164329 1.892792 3.08E-04 30.83768 980.3963 0.757515
sd 1.258847 3.169421 0.034096 0.001055 5.408207 86.98555 0.429016
var 1.584695 10.04523 0.001163 1.11E-06 29.2487 7566.486 0.184055
dp5.3 mean 2.170341 8.997996 1.886903 0.006115 31.71543 981.4791 0.659319
sd 1.237403 2.935381 0.036688 0.072923 5.371274 80.87712 0.552621
var 1.531167 8.616462 0.001346 0.005318 28.85058 6541.108 0.30539
dp5.4 mean 1.785571 8.567134 1.888897 0.019514 31.96393 994.7002 0.432866
sd 1.286364 3.087252 0.033733 0.134813 5.347625 78.28273 0.567707
var 1.654731 9.531127 0.001138 0.018174 28.59709 6128.185 0.322291
dp5.5 mean 3.128257 9.903808 1.894741 3.41E-04 30.73547 976.6556 1.729459
sd 1.217173 3.119888 0.034573 0.001113 5.331027 82.65811 0.471
var 1.481509 9.7337 0.001195 1.24E-06 28.41984 6832.363 0.221841
dp5.6 mean 3.082164 9.957916 1.893316 3.94E-04 30.68537 980.6809 1.699399
sd 1.2318 2.993338 0.032584 0.001559 5.296737 79.11845 0.480357
var 1.517332 8.960073 0.001062 2.43E-06 28.05543 6259.73 0.230743
dp5.7 mean 2.426854 9.222445 1.890801 3.96E-04 31.52305 986.2909 0.953908
sd 1.170316 2.956956 0.0325 0.001295 5.44717 87.42914 0.374755
var 1.369639 8.743592 0.001056 1.68E-06 29.67166 7643.854 0.140442
dp5.8 mean 2.372745 9.308617 1.891251 2.80E-04 31.46894 985.898 0.95992
sd 1.214594 3.096336 0.031641 8.86E-04 5.385588 82.27686 0.378112
var 1.47524 9.587295 0.001001 7.84E-07 29.00456 6769.482 0.142969
Y5. 2.318136 9.19489 1.891314 0.003463 31.29208 984.2688 0.506388
S25. 1.504103 9.259304 0.001126 0.002938 28.79534 6748.807 0.074434
Var(means) 0.344581 0.300976 6.25E-06 4.61E-05 0.230398 31.92297 0.08733
V5 1.848684 9.56028 0.001133 0.002984 29.02574 6780.73 0.161764
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dp6.1 mean 0.681363 2.274549 3.931576 0 31.4509 1020.674 0
sd 0.866995 1.563506 0.023759 0 5.455469 78.84387 0
var 0.75168 2.444552 0.000564 0 29.76214 6216.356 0
dp6.2 mean 1.368737 2.743487 3.932368 0 31.03006 999.7258 0.460922
sd 0.889646 1.637393 0.024151 0 5.49453 85.07972 0.498971
var 0.79147 2.681057 0.000583 0 30.18986 7238.559 0.248972
dp6.3 mean 0.825651 2.326653 3.928298 0 32.56112 1014.396 0.018036
sd 0.877922 1.535232 0.023316 0 5.355042 79.51323 0.133215
var 0.770746 2.356939 0.000544 0 28.67648 6322.354 0.017746
dp6.4 mean 0.699399 2.330661 3.928148 0 32.48096 1027.27 0.012024
sd 0.865341 1.456491 0.027545 0 5.43242 79.62561 0.109102
var 0.748815 2.121367 0.000759 0 29.51118 6340.237 0.011903
dp6.5 mean 2.286573 3.601202 3.930157 0 31.08016 996.812 1.342685
sd 0.918376 1.589144 0.029879 0 5.375236 78.69261 0.646897
var 0.843414 2.52538 0.000893 0 28.89316 6192.526 0.418476
dp6.6 mean 2.418838 3.677355 3.932861 0 31.0521 1000.355 1.440882
sd 0.975053 1.644667 0.022702 0 5.445356 82.96707 0.609506
var 0.950729 2.704928 0.000515 0 29.6519 6883.534 0.371498
dp6.7 mean 1.450902 2.777555 3.930874 0 31.87976 1012.529 0.579158
sd 0.88216 1.5807 0.023089 0 5.392019 84.39548 0.49419
var 0.778207 2.498612 0.000533 0 29.07387 7122.598 0.244223
dp6.8 mean 1.521042 2.875752 3.930306 0 31.86573 1015.996 0.591182
sd 0.918932 1.640536 0.025377 0 5.462174 81.73058 0.492109
var 0.844436 2.691359 0.000644 0 29.83535 6679.888 0.242171
Y6. 1.406563 2.825902 3.930574 0 31.6751 1010.97 0.306613
S26. 0.809937 2.503024 0.000629 0 29.44924 6624.507 0.071935
Var(means) 0.454154 0.305169 2.98E-06 0 0.388728 119.8325 0.08592
V6 1.264091 2.808193 0.000632 0 29.83797 6744.339 0.157854
81 



















dp7.1 mean 1.645291 7.759519 1.89009 4.28E-04 31.42285 1004.647 0.072144
sd 1.240398 2.957918 0.032279 0.001552 5.346203 78.52796 0.258986
var 1.538587 8.749282 0.001042 2.41E-06 28.58189 6166.641 0.067074
dp7.2 mean 2.400802 8.242485 1.892843 0.006418 30.82164 997.5002 0.719439
sd 1.313996 2.873385 0.032574 0.077189 5.409186 82.98657 0.449724
var 1.726586 8.256344 0.001061 0.005958 29.25929 6886.771 0.202252
dp7.3 mean 2.348697 8.106212 1.888295 4.01E-04 31.82966 997.2305 0.651303
sd 1.354249 2.826073 0.033307 0.001325 5.372569 82.49487 0.626276
var 1.833989 7.986688 0.001109 1.76E-06 28.8645 6805.403 0.392222
dp7.4 mean 2.072144 8.012024 1.887579 5.33E-04 31.97796 1006.89 0.49499
sd 1.418044 2.997967 0.035824 0.001563 5.53063 80.68806 0.625331
var 2.010849 8.987807 0.001283 2.44E-06 30.58787 6510.564 0.391039
dp7.5 mean 3.368737 9.136273 1.891603 0.008529 30.80962 995.1107 1.695391
sd 1.312706 2.842143 0.037835 0.089369 5.294332 75.73676 0.49839
var 1.723197 8.077778 0.001431 0.007987 28.02995 5736.056 0.248392
dp7.6 mean 3.322645 9.172345 1.890531 3.52E-04 30.82365 996.1598 1.647295
sd 1.232959 2.800308 0.035308 0.001272 5.347837 79.90489 0.526266
var 1.520189 7.841724 0.001247 1.62E-06 28.59936 6384.792 0.276956
dp7.7 mean 2.60521 8.262525 1.890279 4.35E-04 31.6513 995.2613 0.895792
sd 1.333253 2.918783 0.03235 0.001439 5.468296 82.6784 0.500163
var 1.777563 8.519296 0.001047 2.07E-06 29.90226 6835.718 0.250163
dp7.8 mean 2.643287 8.292585 1.88868 3.82E-04 31.57916 994.0101 0.881764
sd 1.311446 2.686902 0.033377 0.001321 5.551805 80.11691 0.518772
var 1.71989 7.219443 0.001114 1.75E-06 30.82254 6418.719 0.269125
Y7. 2.550852 8.372996 1.889988 0.002185 31.36448 998.3512 0.490606
S27. 1.731356 8.204795 0.001167 0.001745 29.33096 6468.083 0.090787
Var(means) 0.341241 0.262154 3.08E-06 1.1E-05 0.231364 22.60338 0.079502
V7 2.072597 8.466949 0.00117 0.001756 29.56232 6490.686 0.170289
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dp8.1 mean 0.723447 2.731463 3.938206 0 31.65932 1024.497 0
sd 0.857094 1.541928 0.01898 0 5.419748 83.26708 0
var 0.73461 2.377542 0.00036 0 29.37366 6933.407 0
dp8.2 mean 1.382766 3.462926 3.938368 0 30.84369 1008.828 0.651303
sd 0.981651 1.730928 0.022668 0 5.480122 86.13998 0.477036
var 0.963638 2.996113 0.000514 0 30.03174 7420.095 0.227564
dp8.3 mean 0.851703 2.947896 3.933422 0 32.52104 1014.804 0.014028
sd 0.919475 1.705557 0.022237 0 5.410931 78.23498 0.117724
var 0.845434 2.908926 0.000494 0 29.27817 6120.712 0.013859
dp8.4 mean 0.733467 2.849699 3.936044 0 32.46293 1027.678 0.01002
sd 0.82573 1.669312 0.021015 0 5.435652 80.46576 0.099697
var 0.68183 2.786601 0.000442 0 29.54631 6474.739 0.00994
dp8.5 mean 2.438878 4.402806 3.937111 0 30.92184 1002.08 1.613226
sd 0.9641 1.745928 0.023351 0 5.357491 84.14335 0.530879
var 0.92949 3.048265 0.000545 0 28.70271 7080.103 0.281833
dp8.6 mean 2.380762 4.358717 3.937835 0 30.87575 1005.98 1.609218
sd 1.023475 1.723211 0.023832 0 5.480578 85.7869 0.550278
var 1.047501 2.969457 0.000568 0 30.03674 7359.392 0.302806
dp8.7 mean 1.498998 3.54509 3.936707 0 31.93988 1020.433 0.719439
sd 0.959783 1.671721 0.022591 0 5.454484 83.30476 0.449724
var 0.921184 2.79465 0.00051 0 29.7514 6939.683 0.202252
dp8.8 mean 1.496994 3.547094 3.93666 0 31.93988 1021.278 0.719439
sd 0.953482 1.671665 0.022648 0 5.470659 83.82859 0.449724
var 0.909127 2.794464 0.000513 0 29.92811 7027.232 0.202252
Y8. 1.438377 3.480711 3.936794 0 31.64554 1015.697 0.374248
S28. 0.879102 2.834502 0.000493 0 29.58111 6919.42 0.0601
Var(means) 0.4645 0.410495 2.52E-06 0 0.481052 86.05511 0.122942
V8 1.343602 3.244997 0.000496 0 30.06216 7005.476 0.183041
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APPENDIX C LINEAR REGRESSION 
The following overview is taken from Hamilton's Regression With Graphics: A 
Second Course in Applied Statistics, chapter two.[Ref. 26]   
One of the simplest ways of relating two variables, X and Y, to each other in a 
mathematical model is with a linear model.  The linear model is merely an expansion of 
the equation for a line, which was introduced to most of us at some point, in junior high 
school or so, as Y = mX + b, with Y the value of Y, X the value of X, m the slope of the 
line, and b the Y-intercept of the line.  In this form, X is the predictor of Y, in that X is 
the cause and Y the effect—Y=f(X).  The linear regression model is an expansion 
because it allows for the same sort of linear expression with terms that can be multi-
dimensional.  Y = mX + b becomes Yi = b0 + b iXi, with X still the predictor of Y, b0 now 
the Y-intercept, and b i the slope.  The i subscript denotes individual observations.   
The linear equation described is nothing other than the line that best fits the data 
collected.  The essential means of determining how well a linear regression model 
approximates the actual response of Y to changes in X is the comparison of the model's 
predicted Y values (Ypi) to the actual Y values (Yi) in from the data.  The difference 
between each predicted Y value and its actual value is called a residual error.   Since a 
prediction can be either above or below the actual value, the residual errors are squared, 
so they are all positive, and then all the squared residual errors are added to give an 
overall measure of the goodness of the model in predicting Y given X, called the sum of 
squared residuals (RSS).  More compactly: 
RSS = Se2i = S(Yi – Ypi)2 
The lower the value of RSS, the closer the fit between predictions and data.  This leads to 
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) criterion for selection of b  values, which is simply to 
select the values of  b i that yield the lowest RSS. 
Another key measurement of a linear model's goodness is the coefficient of 
determination, R2, that gives the proportion of the variance of Y that is explained by X: 
R2 = explained variance/total variance = s2y-pred/s2y 
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R2 ranges in value from 0 to 1, with a value of 0 meaning the that the changes in the 
variable X account for none of the changes in Y, and a value of 1 meaning that changes 
in the variable X completely explain the changes in Y.  As the sample variance of the 
model's predicted Y values gets closer to that of the actual Y values, the model is more 
closely replicating the reality it is modeling.   
R2 is the "quick look" value that tells whether or not a linear model fits the data 
well, but the importance of individual variables within the model can only be ascertained 
through an examination of their individual p-values, which are generated in any 
regression software output—including Excel.  The p-value reflects a given variable's t-
statistic, and gives a measure of how likely it is that a given variable's effect upon output 
is statistically significant.  If a variable's effect is statistically significant, that means that 
its slope term (b i) is non zero, indicating it should be included in the linear model 
describing changes in Y.   
The development and analysis of regression models is, in practice, more of an art 
than a science, but the basic indicators of R2 and individual p-values go a long way 
toward determining the goodness of a given result. 
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APPENDIX D. OUTPUT GRAPHICS 
Figure 24.   Design Point Six Always Best 
 
Figure 25.   Advantage of Four Patrol Boats Over Two 
 
Leakers vs Attack Type: 




















Leakers vs Design Point: 


















Figure 26.   Advantage of Higher Intercept Speed 
 
Figure 27.   No Clear Difference In Output  
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Figure 28.   No Clear (Significant) Difference in Output 
 
Figure 29.   No Interaction Between Significant Factors 
 































Figure 30.   Design Points Six and Eight Are Best 
 
Figure 31.   Advantage of Four Patrol Boats Over Two  
 
Breaches vs Attack Type: 






















Breaches vs Design Point: 

















Figure 32.   Advantage of Higher Intercept Speed  
 
Figure 33.   No Clear Difference in Output 
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Figure 34.   No Clear Difference in Output 
 
Figure 35.   No Interaction Between Significant Factors 
 








































Figure 36.   Design Points Six and Eight Are Best 
 
Figure 37.   Advantage of Four Patrol Boats Over Two  
 
Range at Intercept vs Attack Type:





















Range at Intercept vs Design Point: 














Figure 38.   Advantage of Higher Intercept Speed  
 
Figure 39.   No Clear (Significant) Difference in Output 
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Figure 40.   No Clear Difference in Output 
 
Figure 41.   No Interaction Between Significant Factors 
 
Range at Intercept vs Design Point:
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